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When legal scholars specializing in financial regulation have examined the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), their lens has usually focused on
matters outside of the core public law expertise they are best positioned to
contribute. This curious state of affairs is the consequence of the historical
mutual disinterest between administrative law scholars and financial regulatory
scholars. This Article helps bridge this divide, conducting a comprehensive
administrative law analysis of the FSOC's Section 113 designation program,
and using it as a case study of an emerging trend in U.S. public law: increased
contestation concerning the legal legitimacy offinancial supervisory programs
that provide for extensive, open-ended iscretion on the part of regulators.
Today, the FSOC's designation program and other supervisory programs
like it require financial supervisors to draw from an ever-deeper eservoir of
administrative discretion to make hypothetical and conjectural assessments of
future events. These programs have come to resemble so-called "risk
regulatory" regimes programs that require the exercise of significant
regulatory discretion to counteract future harms subject to non-trivial
uncertainty. In response, affected regulatory subjects have seized upon this
discretionary power, calling into question the legality of its exercise. This Article
analyzes the legal sufficiency of the procedural and substantive constraints on
the FSOC's discretion embedded in the FSOC's designation statute and its own
rulemakings.
It uncovers several structural problems with the FSOC framework.
Whereas ome of these problems are susceptible to amendatory fixes, others are
not. These more trenchant problems are ubiquitous in risk regulatory regimes,
but financial supervisory regimes have yet to develop the institutional and
doctrinalforms needed to reconcile such open-ended discretion with the rule of
administrative law. In presenting this analysis, the Article fires a warning shot
in the direction offinancial regulators, policymakers, and scholars, cautioning
them that other programs are likely to be contested in the near future.
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Introduction
One of the key pillars of today's financial supervisory system is the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC, or Council).' This new
1. Where this Article uses the term "financial supervision," it denotes the ongoing
application of laws, as well as regulatory rules and guidance, to financial institutions. The practices falling
under the "supervision" umbrella occur in the context of a relationship between a regulated institution and
its supervisor. They are distinguishable from "financial regulation" in that the latter also includes formal
notice-and-comment rulemaking the making of the rules rather than their application. The supervision-
regulation distinction is not airtight; after all, each federal supervisor (for example, the Federal Reserve)
regularly promulgates regulations as well. Furthermore, the relationship is interdependent, as illustrated,
for instance, by the Section 113 designation program that is the subject of this Article. The FSOC's main
task is neither purely supervisory nor purely regulatory. It enforces a regulatory regime embodied in a
rulemaking, but he function of that rule is to initiate a supervisory relationship between the designee and
the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless, the distinctive attribute of a supervisory regime is the ongoing
relationship between the governmental regulator and the regulated institution. The Article will use
"supervisor" and "regulator" interchangeably to refer to the agency performing the supervisory function.
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administrative agency, created by Congress in 2010, is among the most important
and most underappreciated regulatory bodies in American government.
Congress charged the FSOC with sweeping statutory responsibilities to identify
and respond to threats to the "financial stability of the United States," outfitting
it with a series of regulatory powers that had never existed before.2 In this role,
the FSOC serves as a sort of regulatory caulking device or sealant, designed to
plug holes in the regulatory edifice that both hindsight and prospective analysis
reveal.
This Article focuses on the FSOC's most important responsibility: the
designation of systemically significant nonbank financial institutions for federal
supervision. Following the financial crisis, it quickly became an article of faith
among policymakers and experts that one of the principal shortcomings of the
pre-crisis legal-regulatory regime was that "investment banks and other types of
nonbank financial firms operated with inadequate government oversight," which
in turn "left the government ill-equipped to handle the recent financial crisis.
' 3
The designation power, set forth in Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), authorizes the FSOC
to require certain nonbank firms otherwise immune from federal regulatory
oversight to submit to ongoing supervision by the Federal Reserve the most
sophisticated and well-resourced financial regulator. The crux of the designation
authority is that the FSOC is required to designate any nonbank company that
"could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.' '4
This Article examines the Section 113 program as a case study of the
administrative law implications of an emerging trend in U.S. public law:
increased contestation concerning the legal legitimacy of financial supervisory
programs. When legal scholars specializing in financial regulation have
examined the FSOC, their lens has usually focused on matters outside of the core
public law expertise they are best positioned to contribute. And this observation
applies more broadly to studies of the other core pillars of the post-crisis financial
supervisory regime.5 Historically, scholars, commentators, and lawyers engaged
in financial regulation and supervision, on the one hand, and administrative law,
on the other hand, have largely talked past each other. A curious disciplinary
vertigo sets in when financial regulatory experts confront administrative law
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5322(a)(1) (2018).
3. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2-3 (2010).
4. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1). Technically, as discussed at length below, the FSOC
must link the possible threat to one of two sets of circumstances set forth in the statute. These two
triggering factual predicates are (1) the particular "nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities" at the company; and (2) a "material financial distress" at the
firm. Id.
5. Here, I refer primarily to the Federal Reserve's stress testing initiative and its related
capital review program, as well as the resolution planning exercise (also referred to as the "living wills"
program) jointly administered by the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).
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doctrine and theory, or when administrative lawyers have occasion to peer into
the black box of the bank regulatory bureaucracy.
This Article helps bridge this divide, presenting a comprehensive
administrative law analysis of the Section 113 regime. Bearing in mind the
central preoccupation of administrative law with cabining arbitrary bureaucratic
discretion, this analysis must acknowledge how the Section 113 regime, and
other supervisory programs like it, require financial supervisors to draw from an
ever-deeper reservoir of administrative discretion to make conjectural
assessments of future events. These programs have come to resemble so-called
"risk-regulatory" regimes programs that require the exercise of significant
regulatory discretion to prevent or mitigate future harms subject to non-trivial
uncertainty. For decades, most environmental, public health, and workplace
safety regulation has been framed in these terms, but the risk regulation frame is
altogether new in the financial supervisory context.
6
In the case of the Section 113 program, the statute requires the agency to
make a hypothetical assessment concerning whether the subject company could
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States, a task that requires the
exercise of a significant degree of administrative discretion and judgment. The
interpretive guidance promulgated by the FSOC in effect doubles down on
conjecture and discretion. It clarifies that a "threat to the financial stability of the
United States" exists "if there would be an impairment of financial
intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently
severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy."8
The FSOC's critics have seized upon the discretionary power entailed by
this program, decrying it as an example of unconstrained bureaucratic
government. Notwithstanding these critiques, a review of the statutory and
regulatory-supervisory framework for the Section 113 program reveals to the
contrary an elaborate scaffolding of procedural and substantive devices designed
to cabin, structure, and guide the FSOC's exercise of discretion.
That said, these devices, as with any administrative decisionmaking
framework, will only perform a legitimating function if they are susceptible to
consistent and transparent application. Where, on the other hand, regulatory rules
or frameworks are internally inconsistent, or are otherwise insusceptible to
regular, consistent application, they are vulnerable to a challenge on the grounds
that they violate the APA's first commandment: thou shalt not take "arbitrary
and capricious" actions.9 Even more fundamentally, they undercut the
6. To be sure, aspects of modern financial regulatory systems, particularly the bank
supervisory regime, have resembled risk-regulatory regimes for decades. The point here is simply that
those working in the financial regulatory arena did not conceive of the objects of their study and their
practice in those terms.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,657 (Apr. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance]
(emphasis added).
9. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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foundational sources of legal legitimacy claims due process, administrative
fairness, equality before the law, and the deployment of expertise of which the
APA is only our localized legislative expression.0
Underscoring the primacy of its Section 113 responsibilities, the FSOC's
first action was to promulgate a rule setting forth a structured process and a
substantive "Analytic Framework" for its designation inquiries. A detailed
analysis of the Analytic Framework reveals four remediable structural
inconsistencies. These flaws compromise the coherence of the FSOC's
deliberations; consequently, they complicate the agency's ability to legitimate its
designations by demonstrating its adherence to the core administrative law
norms of analytic integrity and consistent and regular applications of rules.
Fortunately, it should be possible for the FSOC to remedy these flaws through a
suite of amendments that would not alter the basic substance of the designation
inquiry.
On the other hand, three other structural problems with the Analytic
Framework are not susceptible to quick amendatory fixes. The first and second
of such problems highlight ubiquitous dilemmas in risk-regulatory regimes.
However, the newness of the risk-regulatory lens in the financial supervisory
context means that regimes such as the Section 113 program are not presently
situated to benefit from the near half-century of institutional and doctrinal
developments that have constrained administrative discretion and reconciled the
existence of open-ended discretion with the rule of administrative law.
The first trenchant problem, which I label the Causality Conundrum, refers
to a particular type ofjustificatory demand that administrative law increasingly
makes of risk-regulatory agencies. We can think of it as posing the following
question: why did the regulator assume that the future would look like that? The
problem for the Section 113 program is that the Analytic Framework eschews
any formal requirement that the Council specify, much less quantify, the
predictive judgments embedded in its assessments of how and whether
companies might cause disruptions to the financial system. The result is that the
Framework makes FSOC designations susceptible to accusations of arbitrariness
because it does not require probabilistic specification of the causal channels
through which a systemic problem might hypothetically occur. The second
trenchant problem, which I label the Regulatory Costs Dilemma, addresses the
judiciary's practice, illustrated recently in the 2015 Supreme Court case
Michigan v. EPA, of invalidating regulatory actions as "arbitrary and capricious"
where the regulator's decision process does not formally account for the costs
10. See ROBERT BALDWIN, RULES AND GOVERNMENT 41-46 (1995) (fealty to legislative
mandate, democratic accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 3 (1990) (adjudicatory
fairness, expertise, and participatory politics); JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 11 (1978) (constitutionality, democratic
accountability, procedural fairness, protection of individual rights, and commitment to just results).
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incurred by regulated entities in connection with the regulatory action." In each
of its designations to date, the FSOC has opted not to take these costs into
account-a practice that, if continued, makes the designations vulnerable to this
de-legitimating critique.
The third problem, which I label the Filter Problem, refers to the FSOC's
decision to accommodate industry requests to insert an additional criterion into
its deliberative process that narrows the universe of possible designees. This
additional filter arguably contradicts the Section 113 statute, and it demonstrates
that despite the clamor about regulatory overreach on the part of financial
industry firms, one of the Framework's most trenchant flaws results in
significant under-regulation compared to what the statute seems to require.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the context for the
administrative law analysis by introducing the basic structure of the FSOC and
the Section 113 program, tracing the genesis of the FSOC, explaining the
consequences of designation, and describing the FSOC's early designation
enforcement practice. Part II explains how the Section 113 program is an
excellent contemporary case study for how government answers the foundational
imperative of administrative law: how to legitimate discretionary bureaucratic
power. It also explains how financial supervisory programs have historically
elided the attention of administrative law, and how that mutual disinterest is no
longer advisable or even tenable. Part III details how Section 113 vests the
FSOC with a deep reservoir of discretionary administrative power. Part III
summarizes the procedural and substantive details of Section 113 investigations
as set forth in the FSOC's 2012 administrative rulemaking, with special attention
on how these procedures operate to channel the Council's discretion.
Parts IV and V set forth the Article's main findings and contributions. First,
Part IV introduces the Filter Problem, the Causality Conundrum, and the
Regulatory Costs Dilemma and clarifies why they are not susceptible to quick
amendatory fixes. It also fires a warning shot in the direction of other financial
supervisors and regulators, since these problems frustrate their attempts to
legitimate their own regulatory actions. Part V identifies the four structural
inconsistencies with the Analytic Framework and recommends a set of
amendments to rationalize the same. In the course of uncovering these problems,
it lays out the first comprehensive conceptual map of the FSOC's complicated
Analytic Framework, and underscores how the identified problems presently
compromise the legality of the Section 113 program. Part VI concludes.
I. FSOC: From Creation to Contestation
Following the financial crisis, it quickly became an article of faith among
policymakers and experts that one of the principal shortcomings of the pre-Dodd-
Frank legal-regulatory regime was that "investment banks and other types of
11. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
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nonbank financial firms operated with inadequate government oversight," which
in turn "left the government ill-equipped to handle the recent financial crisis.
'
"12
The metaphor of the "regulatory gap" was frequently used to explain this
administrative failure. One of the primary animating purposes behind the Dodd-
Frank Act was the perceived need to fill those gaps: to construct an institutional
apparatus to enable administrative government o surveil, understand, and
ultimately protect the systemic integrity of the entire financial system. The
Financial Stability Oversight Council would serve as this administrative gap-
filling mechanism, occupying itself in the epistemic and, ultimately, legal-
regulatory spaces that had gone under-examined in the lead-up to the financial
crisis. With the FSOC, Congress built out the former financial regulatory system
into a new dimension, focused on the financial system as such rather than
individual financial institutions.
13
A. The Idea of the FSOC: The Ultimate Regulatory Caulking Device
To appreciate the FSOC's purpose, it is necessary to understand its origins.
The FSOC was conceived of as a sort of regulatory sealant, filling in the
perceived "gaps" in the institutional apparatus of financial regulation that
policymakers identified, in hindsight, as having catalyzed the financial crisis.'4
Historically, Congress has preferred to structure the financial regulatory system
as an entity-centric system in which administrative agencies supervise individual
financial institutions (and their holding companies) rather than the financial
markets in which those institutions transact or the financial functions they
perform much less the entire financial system.'5 This system has the advantage
12. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2-3 (2010).
13. Sometimes, this system-wide regulatory scheme is referred to as "macroprudential"
to distinguish it from "microprudential" regulation's focus on individual institutions. See, e.g., Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a
Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May 5, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20110505a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJY2-
5M3K].
14. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 96
(2014) (lamenting that "America's balkanized regulatory system" was "riddled with gaps and turf
battles"); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES xviii (2011) (arguing that deregulation "had opened up gaps in oversight of critical areas
with trillions of dollars at risk, such as the shadow banking system and over-the-counter derivatives
markets"); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter OBAMA REGULATORY
REFORM WHITE PAPER], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UWH4-86ES].
15. See Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2049 (2013) ("Financial services regulation embodies entity-centrism, in that it is
largely premised on the notion that the entity is the appropriate unit of regulation."). It might be argued
that some types of arguably "financial" regulation, such as securities mandatory disclosure rules, are
function-based rather than entity-based in the sense that such regulations apply broadly to securities
transactions irrespective of the type of entity undertaking the transactions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4)
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of determinacy: specific charters are required for entry into specific markets
(e.g., banking, insurance, and securities). And with the charter comes a
designated supervisor. On the other hand, the system has the well-documented
shortcoming of leaving the administrative state without the ability to see the
(systemic) forest for the (institutional) trees. There were, in other words,
regulatory gaps.
During and after the crisis, this spatial metaphor of the regulatory "gap"
gained currency as a rhetorical device to describe the ways in which this entity-
centric system was perceived to have failed.16  Policy entrepreneurs,
understanding that the political economy of financial regulation is such that post-
crisis environments are opportune reform times,17 deployed the metaphor
extensively. Thus, there were regulatory "gaps" when it came to understanding
the nature and size of markets for specific types of transactions, such as the repo
market,'8 or financial functions, such as the clearing and settlement of swaps."
There were also "gaps" when it came to supervising individual institutions; that
(2018) (defining the gateway term "issuer" as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security"); id. § 77b(a)(2) (defining "person" as "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an
association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political
subdivision thereof'). However, such regulatory regimes promote public purposes other than institutional
safety-and-soundness and systemic stability and are therefore distinguishable from the supervisory
regimes with which this Article is concerned. Despite efforts by financial economists to re-conceptualize
the supervisory financial regulation on functional grounds (e.g., regulating insurance as the function of
guaranteeing values of assets (by whatever contractual arrangement entered into with whatever entity)
rather than the writing of insurance contracts by licensed insurance company entities), these regimes have
remained steadfastly entity-centric. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-75,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED TO
IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 64-65 (2016) [hereinafter GAO STREAMLINING REPORT],
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGW6-8BYY]; Robert C. Merton,
Financial Innovation and the Management and Regulation of Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING &
FIN. 461, 466-69 (1995) (advocating viewing the financial system from a "functional perspective" such
that many existing "institutional categories (not only for institutions but for the very products themselves)
will have to be redefined to be operationally effective in setting regulations"); Merton H. Miller,
Functional Regulation, PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 91, 99-103 (1994) (favorably remarking on a "proposal for
functional regulation" but ultimately arguing that "the prospects for [such a proposal] or any other
sweeping reorganization of the current U.S. regulatory landscape are ... remote").
16. Here, I am using the notion of a regulatory gap to refer to a rhetorical expression
about a prior regulatory failing. For a substantive and descriptive theory explaining the persistence of
"regulatory gaps," see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWAL. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
17. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
18. Hank Paulson, U.S. Treasury Secretary during the throes of the financial crisis at
the end of the George W. Bush administration, blamed "gaps in authority" for, among other problems, the
failure of U.S. financial regulators to "deal[] with the ... problems" attendant to the "repo" market, the
evaporation of which was a catalytic circumstance of the financial crisis. See The Shadow Banking System,
Perspective on the Shadow Banking System: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm 'n (2010)
(statement of Henry Paulson).
19. See Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised
Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm
[https://perma.cc/376B-SJDM] (complaining of "major gaps in our regulatory framework," including "a
massive hole" in the form of the "approximately $60 trillion credit default swap (CDS) market, which is
regulated by no agency of government").
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is, even within the predominant paradigm of entity-centric regulation, some
entities fell through cracks in the regulatory edifice.20 Former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke identified "gaps in the government's crisis-
response toolkit" as an explanation for "why the crisis was so severe and had
such devastating effects on the broader economy.' Other commentators
attributed the crisis in part to the unregulated "shadow banking system,"
employing a similar metaphor to refer to nonbanks conducting the fundamentally
bank-like business of extending credit with short-term, cash-like funding
sources.
22
While widespread regulatory failures abounded, nowhere was the
perception of regulatory gaps and shadows more pronounced than with respect
to supervision of the entire financial system. During the financial crisis, both the
George W. Bush and Barack Obama Treasury Departments published regulatory
reform white papers; each document identified the absence of a regulator charged
with the responsibility of systemic oversight as the key shortcoming of the pre-
crisis framework. The Bush white paper complained that developments in
financial markets "are pressuring the U.S. regulatory structure, exposing
regulatory gaps as well as redundancies.23 Most importantly, "no single
regulator possesses all of the information and authority necessary to monitor
systemic risk. ' 24 The Obama white paper similarly invoked the gap metaphor
with respect to systemic risk: "Gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and
regulation of financial firms presented challenges to our government's ability to
monitor, prevent, or address risks as they built up in the system. No regulator
saw its job as protecting the economy and financial system as a whole. 25
20. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Elena Loutskina, A Gap in Regulation and the Looser
Lending Standards That Followed, ECON. COMMENT. (Oct. 9, 2014),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2014-
economic-commentaries/ec-201420-a-gap-in-regulation-and-the-looser-lending-standards-that-
followed.aspx [https:Hperma.cc/N2JM-SB58] ("Mortgage companies were not funded by deposits, so no
institutional regulator oversaw them .... "); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 6 (2008) [hereinafter BUSH BLUEPRINT FOR
REGULATORY REFORM] ("The high levels of delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures among subprime
borrowers in 2007 and 2008 have highlighted gaps in the U.S. oversight system for mortgage origination.
In recent years, mortgage brokers and lenders with no federal supervision originated a substantial portion
of all mortgages and over 50 percent of subprime mortgages in the United States.").
21. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm'n (2010) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
22. See Demyanyk & Loutskina, supra note 20, at 1 ("Because the historical focus of
banking regulation had always been on protecting depositors, shadow banks were subject to less regulation
and oversight than banks before the financial crisis, allowing them to make the riskier loans that ultimately
played such a large role in the crisis."); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/2010b pea gorton.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MQ5-6VLP].
23. BUSH BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 20, at 4.
24. Id.
25. OBAMA REGULATORY REFORM WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 2.
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The Obama white paper envisaged the creation of a Financial Services
Oversight Council as an interagency body designed "to identify emerging
systemic risks and improve interagency cooperation.2 6 In the end, the Dodd-
Frank Act gave form to this interagency body in the form of the FSOC, swapping
out the Obama Treasury Department's "Services" in favor of "Stability." The
House Committee report for the legislation identified three purposes for the new
Council: (1) monitoring potential threats to the financial system, (2) providing
more stringent regulation for nonbank financial companies that pose risks to
financial stability, and (3) providing more stringent regulation for "financial
activities" that pose risks to financial stability.
27
Section 1 2(a)(1) of the final Dodd-Frank Act set forth the formal statutory
mandate for the new regulatory council:
(1) IN GENERAL.-The purposes of the Council are-
(A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise
from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large,
interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that
could arise outside the financial services marketplace;
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of
shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the
Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and
(C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
system.
By including subparagraph (B), with its focus on "promot[ing] market
discipline," Congress ultimately diverged from the House Committee report,
tipping its hat to the standard pro-market faith in the self-equilibrating tendency
of privately ordered markets. But the mandate contemplates an unmistakably
active role for the new Council: it would "identify" and "respond" to "emerging
threats.28
In a sense, then, the FSOC was designed as the ultimate regulatory caulking
device, filling in the gaps and shadows in the regulatory system that hindsight
revealed. As for the perceivedfunctional gaps, the FSOC was charged in Section
804 with the responsibility of designating firms engaged in systemically
significant financial activities the final legislation termed these firms "financial
market utilities" (FMUs) for heightened supervision (as well as access to
26. See OBAMA REGULATORY REFORM WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 3.
27. H.R. REP. No.111-517, at 865 (2010).
28. Subparagraph (C) used the word "identify" to capture what the House Committee
report referred to as "monitoring."
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Federal Reserve liquidity).29 In July 2012, the FSOC unanimously designated




Congress filled the entity gap with the Section 113 designation program.
31
In a world where entity-centrism had prevailed from the beginning, this charge
was the most important of the FSOC's responsibilities. Section 113, especially
when considered in combination with the Council's new informational duty to
monitor system-wide risk and coordinate among the diverse entity-supervisors,
also addressed the perceived system gap that is, the gap in surveillance of
systemic risk as such. In case there remained any other conceptual category of
regulatory space that was not addressed by these gap-fillers, Congress vested the
FSOC with a residual authority to "to identify gaps in regulation that could pose
risks to the financial stability of the United States.32 Having patched over all the
gaps, the new regulator was told to keep a tube of sealant on hand going forward,
keeping an eye out for any new emerging cracks.
The picture that emerges from the FSOC's genesis story is the design of an
institutional panacea capable not only of curing the ills of the last crisis, but also
of monitoring and forestalling the next one. It is an instrumentalist tool designed
to colonize a new and potentially unbounded regulatory space. Whether it is, as
a practical matter, capable of succeeding in that charge is an empirical matter
that is altogether outside the scope of this Article, which focuses more narrowly
on the administrative law questions concerning the legal control of the FSOC's
discretionary powers.
B. An Introduction to the Designation Statute: Its Significance and Structure
The linchpin of this new system-focused financial regulatory regime is the
FSOC's authority under Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act to "designate"
financial institutions not presently supervised by federal banking regulators
referred to by the legislation as "nonbank financial companies" for supervision
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 112(a)(2)(J),
804, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5463 (2018). Specifically, Section 804 requires the FSOC, after consultation with
the Federal Reserve and the relevant federal agency that has primary jurisdiction over an FMU under
federal banking, securities, or commodity futures laws (e.g., the SEC or the CFTC), to identify and
designate an FMU that is, or is likely to become, systemically important. See Authority to Designate
Financial Market Utilities as Systemically Important, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,763, 44,763 (July 27, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1320). In assessing a possible FMU's systemic importance, the Council considers
whether a "failure of or disruption to an FMU could create, or increase, the risk of significant liquidity or
credit problems spreading across financial institutions and markets and thereby threaten the stability of
the U.S. financial system." Id.
30. See Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability
Oversight Council Makes First Designations in Effort to Protect Against Future Financial Crises (July 18,
2012) https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1645.aspx [htt s://perma.cc/9TXF-
JJMJ].
31. The FSOC was also instructed to recommend additional supervisory requirements
for the Federal Reserve to implement in connection with its supervision of such companies.
32. Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(2)(G).
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by the Federal Reserve.33 The FSOC's role is that of a gatekeeper rather than a
supervisor; the FSOC designates, and the Federal Reserve supervises. The statute
is noteworthy because of both its consequences and its structure.
1. The Significance of Section 113
The anticipated consequences of the Section 113 designation program are
significant for both the economy and the designated companies. Given the
centrality of the idea of the "systemic risk" problem to the broader Dodd-Frank
legislative scheme,34 it is not surprising that the FSOC's organic statute is set
forth in Title I, Subtitle A of the Act. As noted earlier, the FSOC's Section 113
authority is its most consequential power.35 As a baseline matter, most of the
nonbank financial companies subject to potential designation will never have
been subject o any consolidated supervision,3 6 let alone federal supervision by
the Federal Reserve, by good measure the most sophisticated and well-resourced
of U.S. financial regulators. Once designated, nonbank financial companies will
be required to report to, and submit to examinations by, the Federal Reserve.3
These companies are also made subject to Section 8 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act,38 which outfits supervisors with wide-ranging enforcement
authority, including the power to issue cease-and-desist orders on the company
(or its affiliates) if the company engages in any "unsafe or unsound practice[s]
in conducting [its] business.'39 The Act also submits designees to the existing
regulatory regimes concerning prior approval of bank acquisitions40 and
management interlocks at unaffiliated banking institutions.41
Perhaps even more significantly, Section 165 of the legislation instructs the
Federal Reserve to create and apply a heightened suite of prudential standards to
Section 113 designees, as well as large bank holding companies (BHCs) with
33. See Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State
and Federal Authority over Insurance, 5 U. CAL. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1411-12 (2015) (referring to the
FSOC as the "linchpin" of a "new framework for the federal oversight of systemic risk").
34. See supra Section I.A.
35. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 327, 369 (2013).
36. Supervision is said to be "consolidated" when it encompasses an entire company
group that is, a parent company and its subsidiaries. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS.,
102ND ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual-
report/files/2015-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4YE-ACLE].
37. Dodd-Frank Act § 161.
38. Id. § 162.
39. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 8(b)-(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(c) (2018).
40. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 163 (applying the Bank Holding Company Act §
3, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2018), to companies designated under Section 113).
41. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 164 (applying the Depository Institution
Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3208 (2018), to companies designated under Section
113).
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more than $250 billion in total consolidated assets.42 These standards include
risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits, liquidity requirements, risk
management mandates, resolution planning requirements (also known as "living
wills"), single-counterparty credit limits, and stress testing requirements.3 In
recognition of the reality that Section 113 designees are not primarily involved
in the banking business,44 Congress instructed the Federal Reserve to "take into
account differences" among large bank holding companies and Section 113
designees when promulgating these enhanced standards.45 After initially
proposing a one-size-fits-all set of standards for both large BHCs46 and Section
113 designees,4 the Federal Reserve ventually acceded to industry requests to
promulgate separate sets of standards for large BHCs and Section 113
designees.48
The enhanced standards for large BHCs were finalized in March 2014.49 In
July 2015, the Federal Reserve published a particularized set of standards that
would apply uniquely to General Electric Capital Corporation, then and now the
only company designated by the FSOC that is not engaged primarily in the
insurance business.50 A year later, the Federal Reserve published a proposed set
42. BHCs are already subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve under
the Bank Holding Company Act. These "heightened" standards, which apply to BHCs with greater than
$250 billion in total consolidated assets, are more stringent than the general standards applicable to all
BHCs. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L No. 115-174 §
401(a), 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (amending Section 165 to increase the initial threshold from $50 billion to
$250 billion); Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a)(1) (initially providing for a $50 billion threshold).
43. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1); Enhanced Prudential Standards for Systemically
Important Insurance Companies, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,610, 38,610 (June 14, 2016) [hereinafter Proposed
Section 113 Insurance-Focused Standards].
44. Otherwise, these companies (along with their holding companies and depository
affiliates) would already be supervised by federal banking authorities.
45. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(3)(A).
46. "Large BHCs" refers here to BHCs with over $50 billion in total consolidated
assets, although today the applicable threshold would be $250 billion. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
47. See Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for
Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 597 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
48. Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking
Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240, 17,243-44 (Mar. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
49. See id.
50. See Application of Enhanced Prudential Standards and Reporting Requirements to
General Electric Capital Corporation, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,111 (July 24, 2015). GE Capital is a sui generis
case for another reason: owing to its status as a savings and loan holding company (SLHC), GE Capital,
unlike the other Section 113 designees to date, was already subject o consolidated supervision by the
Federal Reserve. However, despite its massive balance sheet ($539 billion as of the end of the 2012
calendar year), as a SLHC it was not automatically subject to Section 165, which applied exclusively to
Section 113 designees and large BHCs. The Federal Reserve divided the GE Capital standards into two
groups, to be phased in according to different timetables: the so-called Phase I standards applied from
January of 2016 the existing BHC standards concerning the risk-based capital, capital conservation buffer
liquidity coverage, and leverage ratio rules; the so-called Phase II standards, by contrast, were to apply
enhancedrequirements concerning general risk management, capital planning, stress testing, liquidity risk
management, and restrictions on inter-affiliate transactions. The Phase II standards will never go into
effect because their initial date of application (in January of 2018) post-dates the date the FSOC rescinded
GE Capital's Section 113 designation (in June of 2016). See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS
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of prudential standards for Section 113 designees primarily engaged in the
insurance business.5 ' The Federal Reserve started with insurance standards
because at the time of publication, three of the four Section 113 designees were
insurance-focused financial conglomerates.52 And while this initial set of
standards applies exclusively to insurance-focused designees, the Federal
Reserve should be expected to roll out analogous packages of regulatory
standards as the FSOC identifies other companies from other sectors for
designation.53
As consequential as these heightened prudential standards are, the
ramifications of designation are wider still. One of the under-examined
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to take
"mitigatory actions" against any Section 113 designee or large BHC that "poses
a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States.5 4 Such mitigatory
actions could include requirements that the company restrict or cease certain
activities and transactions, or even divest certain assets.5 5 The latter authority is
only available to the Federal Reserve if other mitigatory actions prove
insufficient, but its import is clear: it authorizes a "break-up" of financial
institutions.56
These regulatory consequences will affect fundamental aspects of some of
the largest financial companies in the economy. For example, in the words of
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL'S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING
GE CAPITAL GLOBAL HOLDINGS, LLC (2016) [hereinafter GE CAPITAL RESCISSION].
51. See Proposed Section 113 Insurance-Focused Standards, supra note 43.
52. See infra Section I.D (explaining that AIG, Prudential, and MetLife were among
the first four Section 113 designees).
53. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105
GEO. L.J. 1379, 1392-95 (2017) (suggesting that asset managers might be the next segment of the financial
sector to be subject to potential Section 113 designation).
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 121(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5331 (2018).
55. Id.
56. The related, but distinct, Title II regime authorizes the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver in an "orderly liquidation" proceeding upon the satisfaction of strict requirements the most
important of which is a determination, shared by the Secretary of the Treasury and two-thirds of each of
the governing boards of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, that a financial company is on the verge of a
default that "would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States." The universe
of companies potentially eligible for orderly liquidation under Title II ("financial companies") is wider
than the universe of Section 113 designees, who would be eligible for Title II afortiori merely due to their
status as nonbank financial companies. Nevertheless, the triggering event for the authority to impose
mitigatory actions under Section 121 (i.e., the company must pose a grave threat to the financial stability
of the United States) is arguably less demanding than that required to trigger the applicability of Title II
(i.e., the company must be on the verge of a default that would have serious adverse effects on the financial
stability of the United States).
57. See, e.g., Proposed Section 113 Insurance-Focused Standards, supra note 43, at
38,612 (mandating the establishment of an independent risk committee of the board of directors with at
least one member with experience in risk management at large, complex financial firms); id. at 38,613-14
(requiring the appointment of a chief risk officer with experience in risk management at large, complex
financial firms and a separate role of chief actuary, as well as the reporting obligations of each); id. at
38,614 (requiring an internal control regime for liquidity risk management); id. at 38,618-21 (requiring
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one commenter affiliated with the pro-business lobby group U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the "prescriptive mandates" set forth in the proposed enhanced
Section 165 prudential standards would amount to "micromanagement" by the
Federal Reserve of private companies that will only "wring out risk by
sacrificing growth and job creation.58 Writing of the BHC standards, the
American Bankers Association warned of "anticompetitive pressures" that
threaten to "contribute to the sluggishness of the economy" and "weaken[] the
very institutions whose financial health they are charged with overseeing.59
Whatever we might think of these plaintive protests on the part of industry
associations, it is unquestionably true that the consequences of designation for
subject nonbank companies will be significant. Consequently, as would occur
with any major administrative process, the Federal Reserve should expect
contestation as it finalizes its Section 165 enhanced prudential standards both
for the present insurance company proposals and any future proposed standards
for other companies and sectors. It should also prepare for the possibility of
litigation challenging them later on. But notwithstanding the import of these
standards, this Article takes as its object of inquiry the analytically prior
administrative process: the FSOC's gatekeeping action to designate a company
in the first place.
2. The Structure of Section 113
The structure of the designation statute requires the FSOC to make highly
discretionary judgments concerning the systemic significance of nonbank
financial companies. The statute defines the term "nonbank financial company"
to include any "U.S. nonbank financial company" and any "foreign nonbank
financial company." Together, these terms cover any company, whether
domiciled in the United States or elsewhere, that is (1) "predominantly engaged
in financial activities"; 60 and (2) not subject to an express exclusion,61 the most
at-least-monthly liquidity stress tests and imposing a ninety-day liquidity buffer requirement that must be
maintained over the range of liquidity stress scenarios).
58. Comment Letter, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Proposed Enhanced
Prudential Standards for Systemically Important Insurance Companies (Aug. 17, 2016).
59. Comment Letter, American Bankers Association, Proposed Enhanced Prudential
Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies (Apr. 30, 2012).
60. Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4).
61. Excluded from the definition of "nonbank financial companies" are (i) BHCs, (ii)
Farm Credit System institutions chartered and subject to the provisions of the Farm Credit Act of 1971,
(iii) SEC-registered national securities exchanges, clearing agencies, and security-based swap execution
facilities and data repositories (in each case, including their corporate parents), (iv) CFTC-registered
boards of trade designated as contract markets and derivatives clearing organizations (in both cases,
including their corporate parents), and (v) CFTC-registered swap execution facilities and data repositories.
These non-BHC exclusions operate to channel most securities and derivatives facilities into the Section
804 designation regime for financial market utilities rather than the Section 113 designation regime for
nonbank financial companies. Even in the Section 804 context, the SEC and CFTC, the federal regulators
of securities and derivatives markets, protected their turf by obtaining a similar exclusion for entities
registered with their agencies; however, the Section 804 exclusion applies "only with respect to the
activities that require the entity to be so registered." Id. § 803(6)(B).
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important of which is the BHC exclusion.62 The statute specifies that a firm is
predominantly engaged in financial activities if "activities that are financial in
nature" (as that phrase is defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956)
either "account for" at least 85% of its consolidated annual gross revenues or
"relate to" 85% or more of the company's consolidated assets.63 The statute
further instructs the Federal Reserve to promulgate standards for determining if
a company is "predominantly engaged in financial activities. 64
As described so far, the statutory scheme entails very little administrative
discretion. That assessment changes once we consider the Section 113 systemic
risk determination. Section 113 empowers the FSOC to designate a nonbank
financial company if it finds one or both of two factual predicates is present: (1)
a "material financial distress" at the company "could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States"; and (2) the "nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or [the] mix of [its] activities" could pose
such a threat.65 The FSOC refers to these pathways to designation as
"Determination Standards."66 Both Determination Standards share a conditional
grammar. In each case, the statute requires the agency to make a conjectural
assessment concerning whether the subject company could pose a threat, a task
that requires the exercise of a significant degree of administrative discretion and
judgment. With Section 113, Congress has instructed the regulator to inquire into
what "could" occur namely, whether a given set of factual circumstances
concerning a nonbank financial company could hypothetically pose a threat to
the financial stability of the United States. Furthermore, with the First
Determination Standard, the factual circumstance itself is conditional the
FSOC must hypothesize that a presently solvent company enjoying access to
liquidity sufficient to support its operations would experience a material
financial distress.6
Figure 1 below illustrates the two layers of conditionality that are
preconditions to a Section 113 designation under the First Determination
Standard the only standard the FSOC has invoked to date.
62. The definition excludes bank holding companies because they are already subject
to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve. It reflects the reality that the entity gap emerged
outside the bank regulatory system, hence the need for the FSOC to designate "nonbank financial
companies."
63. Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(6).
64. Id § 102(b); see also Definitions of "Predominantly Engaged in Financial
Activities" and "Significant" Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 78 Fed. Reg.
20,756 (Apr. 5, 2013).
65. Id § 113(a)(1).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 381-385.
67. See infra text accompanying note 383.
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Figure 1
Hypo~etc~I i: v~ot~t~aI 2:
Cunil Imgn Council mages HowThat 
Scenaio That Would Lead e n I n iF .t ection
to Mte~aI FnanialCould pose a Threat to
On its face, the statute metes out a virtually limitless decision space for the
FSOC. It is possible to imagine a vast array of hypothetical scenarios that could
cause material financial distress that cou/d pose a threat to financial stability. By
requiring the Council to make these inherently contestable determinations,
Congress has plainly woven a significant degree of discretion into the
administrative apparatus it created.
While there are theoretical limits on the ability of Congress to delegate
discretion to administrative officials, those limits have little real-world bite.
When delegating lawmaking authority to an agency, Congress is bound only by
the non-delegation doctrine. As a doctrinal matter, that administrative law canon,
which arises out of the separation-of-powers principle of U.S. constitutional law,
requires Congress to set forth an "intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [exercise administrative discretion] is directed to conform.
As a practical matter, however, the doctrine has rarely limited Congress , 6 9 and
today amounts at most to a "kind of vagrant [judicial] threat" that Congress
"could go too far in transferring unguided power. an 0 The doctrine is the judicial
expression of the familiar linear, instrumentalist logic of administrative law,
requiring only that the agency's compliance with the instructions of Congress is
susceptible to ex post ascertainment.
With Section 113, Congress set forth ten criteria the FSOC must consider
in deciding whether to designate a nonbank financial company, and also included
an eleventh catch-all criterion covering "any other risk-related factor that the
[FSOC] deems appropriate." ' While the primary effect of including these
criteria was to respond to a political imperative to structure and cabin the
delegation of discretion to the FSOC, in the process they also ensured the
designation statute satisfied-indeed, by good measure-the exiguous
requirements of the non-delegation doctrine. To be sure, interesting legal
68. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
69. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (limiting the non-delegation
doctrine's application to legislative delegations characterized by "an absence of standards for the
guidance" of regulatory discretion, such that "it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain
whether the will of the Congress has been obeyed").
70. GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
72 (1991) (emphasis added).
71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 113(b), 12 t.S.C.
§ 5323(b) (2018).
Vol. 36, 2019
The FSOC's Designation Program as a Case Study
questions remain concerning the proper application of the FSOC's designation
discretion, but the constitutionality of the statutory basis for that discretion is
beyond legal reproach.
C. (A Brief Note on) Organizational Structure
The FSOC is a formal, standing interagency body comprised primarily of
the heads of existing financial supervisors. Its membership consists of ten voting
members, each with an equal vote, and five non-voting members. The voting
members are the Secretary of the Treasury (who serves as chair of the FSOC),
the Chairperson of the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Director
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Chairperson of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Chairperson of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission CFTC), the Chairperson of the National Credit
Union Administration Board (NCUAB), the Director the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), and an independent presidential appointee with
insurance expertise.72 The non-voting members are the Director of the Office of
Financial Research (OFR), the Director of the Federal Insurance Office
(FIO),74 a state insurance commissioner, a state banking supervisor, and a state
securities commissioner.
71
This Article focuses on the problem of administrative discretion in
connection with the FSOC's Section 113 program. It is concerned with the
breadth of that discretion, the constraints on that discretion, and, ultimately, the
adequacy of those constraints under currently applicable U.S. administrative law.
In conducting that analysis, it also presents the Section 113 program as a case
study that offers lessons to financial regulators, financial institutions, and
scholars of financial regulation and administrative practice more broadly.
As such, it does not purport to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the
Council's structure. Instead, it adopts a black-box approach that takes as its
object of inquiry a decision, action, or inaction of an agency, whatever the
structure of the agency might be. That decision is motivated by both
methodological and doctrinal considerations. Methodologically, isolating the
decision-action-inaction results in a cleaner, more analytically compact unit of
72. See id. § 11 (b)(1).
73. The Dodd-Frank Act established the OFR within the Department of the Treasury
"to support the [FSOC] in fulfilling [its] purposes and duties." Id. § 153(a).
74. The Dodd-Frank Act established the FIO within the Department of the Treasury. Its
most important duties are to coordinate and consult with foreign and state insurance regulators (as
appropriate) on behalf of the U.S. federal government (with respect o "prudential aspects of international
insurance matters," "insurance matters of national importance," and "prudential insurance matters of
international importance"), "monitor all aspects of the insurance industry," and provide advice to the
FSOC in connection with insurance matters. See id. § 502(a).
75. Each of the state regulator non-voting members are "designated by a selection
process determined by such [state regulators]." Id. § 11 (b)(2).
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inquiry. Moreover, the subject of inquiry discretion and its constraints is the
core subject of administrative law, which will allow the analysis to apply more
readily in other administrative contexts. Finally, the choice to focus on discretion
and its constraints rather than on the Council's structure is consistent with the
current state of administrative law doctrine, which provides that the APA applies
equally to all administrative agency action, irrespective of the structure and form
76of the particular agency at question.
Nothing here is meant to suggest that the FSOC's structure does not merit
further study. In fact, its novel structure makes it an ideal case study for the
developing literature on coordination and collaboration between agencies and
within multi-member agencies.7 7 Its combination of organizational structure and
powers is unique in U.S. administrative practice, but the FSOC bears some
resemblance to other regulatory bodies. The FSOC is a sui generis council
comprised of individuals appointed to head other agencies, with significant and
administratively conclusive 8 policymaking authority. It therefore resembles
independent commissions and executive agencies in the scope of its authority,
but not in its composition. Contrariwise, it resembles statutorily constituted
groupings of regulators like the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC) in its composition, but not in the scope of its more fulsome
authority. In the same way, the FSOC bears a resemblance to less formally
constituted groupings of regulators, such as interagency working groups80 or
supervisory colleges.81 These interagency associations are designed to facilitate
and inform the distinct decisionmaking tasks for which the member agencies
ultimately retain individual responsibility.
76. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525 (2009). But cf
Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm "'with Teeth ": Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive
Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589 (2014) (proposing a more deferential standard of review for executive
agencies in recognition of their greater degree of political accountability due to executive branch
oversight).
77. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183
(2013); JenniferNou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015); Bijal Shah, Uncovering
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARv. L. REV. 805 (2015); cf Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15 (2010); Buzbee, supra
note 16.
78. Of course, as with most agency action, FSOC determinations are subject to judicial
review. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113(h).
79. As with the FSOC, the membership of FFIEC (pronounced "Fee-Feck") consists of
the heads of existing supervisors. Specifically, it is comprised of six members: the four heads of the federal
bank and credit union supervisory agencies (Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, and NCUAB), a representative
of state bank examiners, and, since 2011, the Director of the CFPB.
80. See Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2011) (chronicling how the Office of Management and
Budget in the White House convened an informal "interagency working group" for the discrete purpose
of formulating a range of value estimates for the social cost of carbon).
81. See Rolf H. Weber, Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation
and Supervision, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L., 683, 702-03 (2010) (defining a supervisory college as a
"multilateral working group of all supervisors involved in the supervision of an international banking
group").
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These structural features of an agency's design obviously impact the
efficiency and output of its administrative process, but they also have deeper
implications for the felt legitimacy of agency programs; Dan Schwarcz and
David Zaring have made this very point with respect to the FSOC.8 2 The
legitimating effect of agency structure, while of obvious significance to any
agency, ultimately concerns a more protean, polymorphous idea of
administrative legitimacy writ large of which compliance with the rule of
administrative law, the subject of this Article, is but a single and discrete
contributing factor.
83
D. Early History of Section 113 Designations
The FSOC's first eight years have been turbulent and eventful, with
multiple designations and rescissions, judicial review of designations, as well as
political and administrative efforts to shape FSOC designation policy. As of
February 2018, the FSOC had used its Section 113 authority four times to
designate nonbank financial companies for Federal Reserve supervision. Three
of these designations involved financial companies engaged primarily in
insurance activities: MetLife, Inc.; Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential); and
American International Group, Inc. (AIG). The fourth designated firm, General
Electric Capital Corporation, Inc. (GE Capital), was the financial services arm
of the multinational conglomerate General Electric Company. In each case, the
FSOC designated the company pursuant o the First Determination Standard: that
is, it determined that a material financial distress at the company could pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States.84
In June of 2013, the FSOC announced that it had preliminarily designated
Prudential, AIG, and GE Capital.85 AIG and GE Capital acquiesced to the
FSOC's determination, and the FSOC published its final determinations with
respect to those companies on July 8, 2013. Prudential invoked its rights under
Section 113(e) and requested and received the opportunity to argue its case for
non-designation through submission of written materials and a hearing, which
was held on July 23, 2013.86 On September 19, 2013, the FSOC published its
82. See Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the
NonbankProblem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813 (2017).
83. See Henry S. Richardson, Administrative Policy-Making: Rule of Law or
Bureaucracy?, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW 309, 310 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999) ("[T]he rule of
law, while a necessary support of legitimate democracy, is hardly a sufficient guarantor thereof.").
84. See infra text accompanying note 383 (introducing the distinction between the two
determination standards).
85. Matthew Yglesias, AIG, Prudential Financial, and GE Capital Receive Preliminary
Designation as "'Systemically Important" Financial Institutions, SLATE (Jun. 4, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/06/04/sifis aigprudential and ge capital are systemicall
y important financial.html [https://perma.cc/KGK5-YNW5].
86. See infra text accompanying note 156 (discussing right to hearing provided by
subsection (e)).
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final determination with respect to Prudential, maintaining its initial position that
Section 113 designation was appropriate.8
As discussed in greater detail below, the FSOC has a statutory obligation
to review its designations "not less frequently than annually."88 In July 2016, the
FSOC rescinded GE Capital's Section 113 designation, describing how the
company had "fundamentally changed its business .... [t]hrough a series of
divestitures, a transformation of its funding model, and a corporate
reorganization," the sum of which resulted in GE Capital becoming "a much less
significant participant in financial markets and the economy."89 Many observers
interpreted the rescission of the GE Capital designation as evidence that the
Section 113 program was working as designed. Faced with the prospect of
onerous Federal Reserve supervision, GE Capital had embarked on an ambitious
corporate restructuring that pared back its systemic footprint.
In March of 2016, a district court judge ordered rescission of the MetLife
designation, holding that the FSOC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
designating MetLife.9 The analysis of the Section 113 program set forth below
in Parts III-IV addresses this litigation where relevant.
The attrition from the ranks of Section 113 designees continued, catalyzed
not by the intended systemic-risk-reducing effects of the statute (as with GE
Capital) or by judicial applications of administrative law principles (as with
MetLife), but by politics. The deregulatory winds following the 2016 election
blew another designation aside, when in September 2017 the Council, chaired
by new Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, announced it had voted to
rescind AIG's designation as well.91 The Mnuchin-led FSOC also cemented the
removal of MetLife's designation by withdrawing the pending Obama era appeal
of the judicial order.92 On October 16, 2018, the FSOC rescinded Prudential's
designation.93
The winnowing ranks of Section 113 designees should not be interpreted
as the FSOC's slow march to the gallows. In May 2018, Congress enacted the
first significant rollback of the Dodd-Frank regime in the form of the Economic
87. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL'S FINANCIAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013).
88. See infra Section III.A.6.
89. GE CAPITAL RESCISSION, supra note 50, at 2. Also recognizing the fundamental
changes ushered in by the General Electric Company restructuring, the Federal Reserve accepted GE
Capital's request to de-register as a savings-and-loan holding company in late 2015.
90. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 233-36
(D.D.C. 2016).
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial Company Designation (Sept. 29, 2017).
92. John Heltman, FSOC Gives Up Effort to Designate MetLife as SIFI, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fsoc-gives-up-effort-to-designate-metlife-as-sifi
[https://perma.cc/C3D8-RYSN].
93. Alan Rappeport & Peter Eavis, Trump Administration Releases Prudential from
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Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, known colloquially
as the "Crapo Bill," in reference to sponsoring senator Mike Crapo, the Idaho
Republican. The Crapo Bill left the FSOC regime entirely untouched,94 despite
pressure from House Republicans to fundamentally restructure the designation
program.95 The fact that the program survived the Crapo Bill despite a
Republican White House, a Republican majority in the Senate (along with
several sympathetic Democrat senators), and a Republican majority in the House
of Representatives seems to make it safe to view the Section 113 program as a
fixture in the post-crisis regulatory landscape.
Nevertheless, the federal deregulatory political climate, if not strong
enough to change legislation, has had effects at the administrative level. In April
2017, President Trump requested that the Treasury Department prepare a report
(the Treasury Designations Report) to the White House concerning the FSOC's
designations processes.96 In November 2017, the Treasury Department published
the Report, recommending several reforms that will, if adopted, likely reduce the
application of the designation statute.9 However, the FSOC has taken no action
with respect to the Treasury Designations Report. Moreover, the Report's
recommended reforms fall well short of a comprehensive rework of the FSOC's
designation process. The recommendations which, again, have yet to be
formally proposed, let alone adopted would, among other things, require the
FSOC to formally assess the likelihood that a potential designee experiences
material financial distress, conduct cost-benefit analysis of contemplated
designations, and take into account mitigating factors when analyzing the
systemic effects of a firm's failure.98 The Report's most significant
recommendation is to redirect the FSOC's attention away from entity
designation and towards an "activities-based approach" to preventing systemic
risk.99 Such a reform would fundamentally restructure the FSOC's task and de-
94. See generally Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
95. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPS.,
115TH CONG., THE ARBITRARY AND INCONSISTENT FSOC NONBANK DESIGNATION PROCESS (2017),
https:Hfinancialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2017-2-28 final fsoc report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9NS-RKYY]; Ian McKendry, House Panel Approves Bill to Raise SIFI Threshold, 20
Other Relief Measures, AM. BANKER (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/house-
panel-approves-bill-to-raise-sifi-threshold-20-other-reg-relief-measures [https://perma.cc/H5FR-HHJZ].
96. President Donald J. Trump, Memorandum on the Fin. Stability Oversight Council
(Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700265/pdf/DCPD-201700265.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HC2W-5FZJ].
97. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL DESIGNATIONS (2017) [hereinafter TREASURY
DESIGNATIONS REPORT].
98. See id. at 9-12.
99. Id at 10. The "activities-based approach" to systemic risk regulation is discussed in
a forthcoming article. Jeremy Kress et al., Regulating Entities andActivities: Complementary Approaches
to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). Kress et al. characterize the support
for the activities-based approach as a "new consensus that systemic risk regulation should focus on an
activities-based approach." Id. While such a consensus is evident in some policymaking circles (including
the present White House), the authors perhaps overstate the degree of accord, as demonstrated by their
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prioritize the designation power, but it would also require congressional
action,' which is highly unlikely, at least in the near future as evidenced by
the Crapo Bill's modesty with respect to the FSOC and Section 113.
The significance of these reforms will stand out in starker relief as the
reader proceeds through the description of the FSOC's Analytic Framework, but
it suffices for present purposes to note that they would leave intact the basic
regulatory framework. Even during its present quiescence, the designation power
remains as both a symbolic force and a profound threat held in reserve by the
government including future governments less solicitous of industry
complaints about the need to minimize short-term regulatory "burdens" and the
accompanying threats to withhold "products and services."'' In the parlance of
the insurance companies who have populated the list of designees so far, the
regime may face some short-term morbidity risk, but very little long-term
mortality risk.
II. The Administrative Discretion Problem and the FSOC
The FSOC and the Section 113 program face criticism that they violate the
foundational principle of administrative law: namely, that the Council wields too
much unconstrained discretion in administering the program. Critics of the
Dodd-Frank regime have probably made the Section 113 program the target of
this criticism more than any other program. Nevertheless, whatever the merits of
this line of attack may be, it certainly applies with equal force to much broader
swaths of the financial supervisory system, particularly the other core, highly
discretionary post-crisis regulatory initiatives such as stress testing, capital
plan reviews, and resolution planning. As such, the Section 113 program
provides an opportunity to conduct an administrative law case study that sheds
light on the encounter between financial supervision and administrative law
more generally.
Notwithstanding the obvious linkages between the two arenas,
commentators involved in debates about administrative law and politics on the
one hand, and financial regulation on the other, have largely talked past each
other.10 2 The build-up of discretionary power in these salient regulatory
programs has caused tension to build along the line that has historically separated
own detailed and convincing critique of activities-based regulation, as well as the Crapo Bill's silence
with respect to the matter. See generally id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
100. See Kress et al., supra note 99, at 48-49.
101. See, e.g., id at 9.
102. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Notes from the Border: Writing Across the Administrative
Law/FinancialRegulation Divide, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 64 (2016); Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking
Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial
Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 131 (2015) (registering the "upside-down aspect" financial
regulation can possess when viewed from an administrative law perspective).
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financial supervision and administrative law. 10 3 It is only a slight exaggeration
to state that the debates about the legitimacy of financial regulatory policy in the
coming years will be written on what is little more than a tabula rasa at this
point. James Freedman famously characterized U.S. administrative law as
afflicted with a "recurrent sense of crisis.' 1 4 To borrow Freedman's phrase, the
administrative law of financial regulation is on the threshold of its own moment
of "crisis.' 0 5 This Article is an early contribution to preempting or, if it is too
late, at least starting to quell that crisis.
The foundational principle of administrative law is that discretionary
administrative power of the sort contemplated by the Section 113 program
demands legitimation of some form or another.0 6 Although the specific
institutional forms administrative law assumes in a given period or context may
vary, its "much deeper purpose" always remains to answer to that justificatory
imperative: to "protect[] against unnecessary or uncontrolled discretionary
power."'0' Unlike with other forms of governmental power, direct accountability
of administrative officials through democratic elections is unavailable in most
cases.'0 8 This ongoing search for alternative legitimating narratives motivated
Freedman's "crisis" observation.0 9  Administrative discretion, however
unavoidable and ubiquitous in modem government,"0 is therefore always
103. To be clear, the separateness is a characterization of the self-conception of the
respective sub-disciplines and the focus of those active in them; as a doctrinal matter, financial regulatory
agencies have always been subject to the requirements of administrative law.
104. See FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 6-7; cf Henry S. Richardson, Administrative
Policy-Making: Rule ofLaw or Bureaucracy?, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
ORDER 309, 311 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999) ("Statutory vagueness is endemic in modern governments,
and has long engendered a sense that their legitimacy is in crisis.").
105. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 7.
106. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law,
in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331, 332 n.7 ("Administrative law
scholars have traditionally viewed administrative discretion as the greatest problem of the field."). The
idea that bureaucratic power demands some form of legitimation was a pillar of Weber's sociology of
bureaucracy. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
953 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff trans., 1968) (registering the "generally
observable need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself'). Gerry Frug's discussion
of this idea's application to the modern administrative state still stands out for its explanatory
thoroughness and theoretical depth. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1984). Frug, it should be pointed out, remains deeply skeptical of attempts to
legitimate bureaucracy.
107. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713, 725
(1969).
108. See FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 7, 265 (noting that agencies are unable to rely
on the legitimating effects of express constitutional treatment or direct political accountability). Of course,
exceptions to this general rule exist, as with the insurance commissioners of California and a minority of
other states, who are directly accountable to the electorate. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in
the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1999).
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. See Keith Hawkins, The Uses of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and
Social Science, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 11, 12 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992); Bruce Ackerman, The
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 696 (2000).
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threatening crisis. It is "inevitable" but also "slightly deviant";"' "it is both
necessary and problematic."
'"1 2
Critics have bestowed on the FSOC epithets denoting arbitrary
discretionary governmental power, such as the Star Chamber"l 3 and the Soviet
Politburo."l 4 Their critiques center on the accusation that it wields too much
discretion with too little accountability and transparency."15 Its "almost
unlimited, unreviewable and sometimes secret bureaucratic discretion" amounts
to a "threat to the Constitution" and a "breakdown of the separation of
powers."",16
And separation of powers is not the only alleged constitutional infirmity;
the FSOC's broad discretionary powers also might implicate the due process
rights of designated companies" or at least fall short of"sound administrative
practice.""l 8 Another commentator prefers literary allusion, arguing that pointing
out the inherently arbitrary nature of the Council's powers is tantamount to
noticing that the "emperor has no clothes.""l 9 Formerly designated company
MetLife complained that FSOC determinations result from "unbounded
speculation and conjecture."'20 More prosaically, the Republican members of the
111. D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL
DISCRETION 1 (1990).
112. WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 29
(1985).
113. See MetLife's Big Win for Taxpayers, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/metlifes-big-win-for-taxpayers-1459381190 [https://perma.cc/W62S-
KTAB].
114. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at AEI Conference on Financial
Stability (July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Piwowar AEI Remarks], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-
spch071514msp [https://perma.cc/P93F-NJYB] (referring also to the FSOC as the "Firing Squad on
Capitalism").
115. See C. Boyden Gray, The Nondelegation Canon 's Neglected History and
Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 619, 642 (2015) (complaining that Congress failed to
provide the FSOC with "an intelligible principle to cabin the agency's discretion"); Press Release, U.S.
House of Representatives Fin. Servs. Comm., Hensarling: Bureaucrats' Spending Should Be on Budget
(Apr. 14, 2016), https:Hfinancialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID 400566
[https://perma.cc/3QCF-K3PF].
116. C. Boyden Gray, Dodd-Frank, The Real Threat to the Constitution, WASH. POST
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123003482.html?noredirect on [https://perma.cc/C5NQ-7JQ8].
117. Complaint at 73-75, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp.
3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-45).
118. See William M. Butler, Falling on Deaf Ears: The FSOC's Evidentiary Hearing
Provides Little Opportunity to Challenge a Nonbank SIFI Designation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 663, 673-
74 (2014) (suggesting that FSOC's discretion to deny an oral hearing in a Section 113 designation process,
despite likely surviving a due process challenge under current law, violates sound principles of
administrative government).
119. Peter Wallison, FSOC Lacks Credibility in Designating SIFIs, AM. BANKER (Jun.
30, 2014) (emphasis added), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fsoc-lacks-credibility-in-
designating-sifis [https://perma.cc/Z4B6-M4LE].
120. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiff MetLife, Inc.'s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Summary Judgment at 33, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d
219 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-45) [hereinafter MetLife Brief].
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House Committee on Financial Services describe the FSOC's designation
process as "arbitrary and inconsistent."'' Others level their aim at Congress,
decrying the FSOC as having been "famously underinstructed"'122 with an "ill-
defined mandate" and "vague directive."'
123
These complaints are, at their core, objections about excessive unstructured
discretion, and they therefore plainly implicate administrative law. According to
these critics, the Section 113 program, either (or both) in its very structure or in
the way it is applied, involves a pathological and illegitimate use of discretion.
124
This Article engages with these complaints, finding that they both understate and
overstate the case, and also invites those working in and writing about financial
supervision to draw analogies between the FSOC's Section 113 program and
other regulatory programs.
The administrative law analysis of the program must evaluate the effects of
the procedural and substantive scaffolding that Congress and the Council have
built into the program to channel the Council's administrative discretion.
Historically, modem administrative law has answered the l gitimacy question by
erecting regulatory process safeguards.125 In a dynamic and complex regulatory
space where delegated power is necessary, these procedural strictures and
structured forms of decisionmaking perform a crucial legitimating role for
regulatory bodies. 126 They channel delegated discretionary power, narrowing the
agency's decision space, so that it exercises power in non-arbitrary ways.
Furthermore, procedures force agencies to move deliberately and openly, giving
121. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., 115TH
CONG., supra note 95, at 3 (2017), https:Hfinancialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2017-2-
28 final fsoc report.pdf[https:/perma.cc/J9NS-RKYY].
122. PHILIP A. WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE
RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 203 (2015); see also id. (faulting Congress for having
hampered the efforts of the Council to "achieve legitimacy by producing a better-defined process, clear
accountability mechanisms, and a clear statement of the outer limits of its authorities").
123. Norbert Michel, Dodd-Frank's Financial Monster Council: The FSOC, FORBES
(July 7, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2014/07/07/dodd-franks-financial-monster-
council-the-fsoc/#3dff70c82fSf [https://perma.cc/W7WT-396J].
124. Cf. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
25 (1969) (comparing discretionary power in a "government of men" to a "malignant cancer" that tends
"to stifle the portion [of the government] that is a government of laws").
125. See JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 15 (1985)
(referring to the "peculiarly intense focus on the idea of legitimating administrative power through
controlling administrative process"); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1039, 1057 (1997) ("The overall objective was to legitimize the discretionary powers
of agencies by assimilating them into a legal process that emphasized the importance of clearly articulated
agency standards and the availability of judicial review as a check on abuses of agency discretion.").
126. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 39 (1990) (noting how
legal procedures embody modern "rational-legal authority" because they "are nothing in themselves, but
everything insofar as they are instruments for ascertaining, measuring, and aggregating choice");
FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 266 (recommending "effective administrative procedures" in "formal and
informal proceedings, that give promise of being fair, efficient, and responsive to democratic values and
constitutional restraints").
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politicians and their constituents time to react before decisions become final.
12 7
The directive for agencies and the legislative bodies that constitute them, then,
is to cabin "discretion through appropriate safeguards and to confine and guide
[it] through standards, principles, and rules.' 28
Care should be taken not to overstate this characterization of administrative
law as proceduralism. The actual historical praxis of administrative law
implicitly deconstructs one of the legal profession's favorite formalist binaries,
that of procedure and substance. Instead, procedure and substance are always co-
determinants of a regulatory regime. For example, consider the important role of
scientific, technical expertise in modem regulatory regimes. In an earlier era in
which the "expertise" paradigm prevailed, agency discretion was legitimate
because it would be exercised in furtherance of Congress's identified
objectives12 9 and in accordance with appropriate forms of scientific or
professional methodology.13 Administrators were analogous to "skilled
doctors" whose judgment, because it adhered to professional norms, was beyond
reproach.13 1 While expertise appeared a substantive legitimating criterion, its
effectiveness depended on adherence to disciplinary norms and scientific
methods factors of a decidedly procedural nature.
In recent decades, all three branches of government and the agencies
themselves have increasingly leaned on substantive, instrumental rationality as
a legitimating device for regulatory actions.132 Richard Stewart has aptly
127. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989).
128. Davis, supra note 107, at 725; see also DAVIS, supra note 124, at 3-4 (arguing that
the best way to "assure that where law ends tyranny will not begin" is to "do much more than we have
been doing to confine, to structure, and to check necessary discretionary power").
129. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 59 (2009) (arguing that
deference to administrators was justified as legitimate under the belief that "their expertise made them
more trustworthy"); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1618 (1985) (noting that under the expertise paradigm, "[t]he administrator's
task was merely to solve the problems identified by democratic processes," which therefore meant that
"the legitimacy of his role was no major issue").
130. See MASHAW, supra note 125, at 18-19 ("By virtue of constant exposure to a single
type of problem, as well as by selection of personnel with specialized training, the administrative agency
could bring to bear an expertise that generalist courts and generalist legislatures could rarely hope to
match."); ROBINSON, supra note 70, at 19; Joseph G. Metz, Democracy and the Scientific Method in the
Philosophy of John Dewey, 31 REV. POL. 242, 242 (1969) (describing how John Dewey thought that
instrumentalism and the scientific method could invigorate democracy); cf Interstate Commerce Comm'n
v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910) ("[T]he training that is required, the
comprehensive knowledge which is possessed, guards or tends to guard against the accidental abuse of its
powers, or, if such abuse occur, to correct it.").
131. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975).
132. This development has coincided with a waning of emphasis on political pluralism
(and its procedural norms) and the waxing of republicanism and "deliberative democracy" (and its
deliberative norms) as normative theories of good government. See PAUL P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 334 (1990); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 64-65 (2002) (assigning a
deliberative democracy government the role of "inform[ing] people of the real facts"); Mark Seidenfeld,
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characterized this development as the "analytic management" turn of U.S.
administrative law.'3 3 Cost-benefit analysis, the method of evaluating possible
projects or regulations based on economic principles,'34 has supercharged this
trend in public administration and law toward substantive, instrumental
rationality.135 In particular, it has bolstered the faith of government actors to
obtain substantively correct, 136 or at least "better," policy outcomes. 137 But here,
too, we see the blending of procedural and substantive legitimating devices,
particularly in the extent o which the analytic management model acknowledges
the political-institutional realities of administration namely, that agency action
cannot be legitimated solely by reference to its adherence to expert disciplinary
methods. Instead, Congress, the White House, the independent and department
agencies, and the courts all play roles in developing and legitimating
substantively rational regulatory policy.
So, what are we to make of the procedural and substantive devices
channeling the FSOC's discretion in making Section 113 determinations?
Despite the complaints about the FSOC's allegedly unbounded discretion, a
review of (1) the Council's statute, (2) its detailed and descriptive interpretive
guidance concerning the statute, (3) its formalized decisional process set forth in
an administrative rulemaking and accompanying interpretive guidance, and (4)
its early designation decisions and actions reveals to the contrary an elaborate
scaffolding of procedural and substantive devices and practices designed to
cabin, structure, limit, and guide the FSOC's exercise of discretion. That said,
these devices, as with any administrative decisionmaking framework, will only
perform a legitimating function for the Section 113 program if they are
susceptible to consistent and transparent application.
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1549 (1992); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1549 (1988).
133. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,443-44 (2003).
134. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 54 (2014); Non, supra note 77, at 449 (describing cost-benefit analysis
as "an accounting of the anticipated quantitative and qualitative effects of a regulation").
135. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
136. Citing advances in probability theory, computing power, implicit preference
analysis, and applied analytical techniques, policymakers have increasingly trumpeted "comprehensive
rationality" as an ideal type of administrative policymaking. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms
in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 395-99 (1981) (noting that Charles Lindblom had, in an
influential article published just two decades earlier, derided such a "comprehensive rationality" method
of policymaking as a naive ideal type).
137. At the risk of overly complicating things, it should also be pointed out that a
qualification to the qualification is in order. When dealing with regulatory constraints, the procedure-
substance dichotomy is frequently an unhelpful device, as most of these substantive restrictions on agency
discretion take the form of procedural requirements with which agencies must comply. See, e.g., Nestor
M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence at QIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 283 (2015)
(referring to "trans-substantive administrative process"); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 136 (2003). Sure, these procedural
requirements are unrelated to enhancing public participation in regulation (the pluralist desideratum of
much of mid-twentieth century proceduralism), but they are procedural nonetheless.
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Where, on the other hand, regulatory rules or frameworks are internally
inconsistent, or are otherwise insusceptible to regular, consistent application,
they are vulnerable to a challenge on the grounds that they violate the APA's
first commandment: thou shalt not take "arbitrary and capricious" actions.
13
Even more fundamentally, they undercut the foundational sources of legal
legitimacy claims due process, administrative fairness, equality before the law,
and the deployment of expertise of which the APA is only our localized
legislative expression. 139
III. Section 113 Rulemaking: The Three-Stage Investigation Process and the
Substantive Analytic Framework
This Part prepares the necessary groundwork for the later exploration of the
broader implications of the structural problems with the Section 113 program. It
does so by introducing how the FSOC has set up the procedural details and
analytic substance of its designation investigations. The stylized formalism of
these regulatory materials disguises the reality that the nature of the fundamental
inquiry that Congress delegated to the FSOC requires the agency to exercise a
high degree of regulatory discretion and judgment. Of course, as discussed above
in Part II, this problem is ubiquitous in administrative law. Together, the Analytic
Framework and the structured process set forth in the FSOC's final rule are
designed to legitimate the FSOC's designation process through procedural and
substantive safeguards, focusing and narrowing the agency's focus and attention
as a check against the potential exercise of arbitrary administrative power and
discretion. How well these safeguards perform that function will be taken up
below in Parts IV and V.
Faced with the task of interpreting and applying such a wide-ranging, not
to mention centrally important, statutory mandate, the FSOC acted quickly to
structure its administrative process for designating companies. Only three
months after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Council undertook its
first ever rulemaking action by issuing an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking concerning the Section 113 designation process. It solicited feedback
from interested parties in an effort "to gather information as it beg[an] to develop
the specific criteria and analytical framework by which it will designate nonbank
138. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Palermo v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 843, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1993)
(invalidating FDIC rule concerning evidence of ownership of bank certificates of deposit in part because
it included "irreconcilable" provisions that could not "stand together" and therefore was "arbitrary and
capricious" under the APA); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(striking down the SEC's proxy access rule because court found the Commission's analysis to be
"internally inconsistent"); Gen. Chem. Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("Because the ICC's analysis... is internally inconsistent and inadequately explained, we find its ultimate
conclusion... to be arbitrary and capricious.").
139. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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financial companies for enhanced supervision u der the [Dodd-Frank Act]."' 40
The stated purpose of the FSOC's Section 113 rulemaking was twofold: first, to
provide further structure, beyond the statutory criteria, to the agency's Section
113 deliberations; and second, to foster transparency and minimize uncertainty
with respect to those determinations.
14 1
A few months later, in January 2011, the FSOC issued its first formal notice
of proposed rulemaking142 and nine months later, the FSOC published a second
notice of proposed rulemaking,143 in each case responding to comments from
interested constituencies. As is customary with financial regulatory rulemaking,
commenters consisted overwhelmingly of industry members and their trade
associations.144 In April 2012 almost two years following the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act, but before it had designated any companies the FSOC
published a final set of rules structuring the Section 113 program. The rule sets
forth (1) the procedural details of the Section 113 designation process and (2)
accompanying interpretive guidance-referred to as the "Analytic Framework"
and attached as an appendix to the rule concerning how the FSOC intends to
interpret the statute and apply its discretion in designating systemically important
nonbank financial companies for supervision.141
A. The Section 113 Designation Process
This Section introduces the procedural details of the Section 113
designation process, which are set forth in the final rule itself (as opposed to the
accompanying Analytic Framework). The FSOC opted to structure its
140. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,653, 61,653 (proposed Oct. 6, 2010).
141. See Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,639 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
142. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,555 (Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter First FSOC Section 113 Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking].
143. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,264 (Oct. 11,2011) [hereinafter Second FSOC Section 113 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking].
144. See First FSOC Section 113 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 142, at
4,556 (reporting that industry members and industry trade associations accounted for thirty-seven of the
fifty comment letters submitted in response to the ANPR); cf Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't 'Screw Joe
the Plummer': The Sausage-Making of FinancialReform, 55 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 58-59 (2013) (using the
so-called "Volcker Rule" rulemaking as a case study to illustrate that the phenomenon of industry
domination of rulemaking proceedings is observable even where public interest groups successfully
motivate citizens to submit comment letters). Wendy Wagner has described how this practice occurs
during the agenda-setting phase that is, before the agency even publishes a notice of proposed
rulemaking. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1381-82 (2010) [hereinafter Wagner, Filter Failure]; Wendy E. Wagner et al.,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA 's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
99, 124-28 (2011).
145. See Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,637.
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deliberations as a three-stage process, with a right to an administrative hearing
and mandatory periodic reevaluation of all eventual designations.
1. Stage 1: An Automatic Sorting Mechanism
In Stage 1, the FSOC "narrow[s] the universe"'146 of potential designees
through the application of quantitative filtering "thresholds" based on certain
data that are reflective of the company's potential vulnerability and riskiness:
total assets, net derivatives liability, total notional amount of credit default swaps
with the potential designee as the reference entity, total debt, leverage ratio, and
short-term-debt-to-total-debt ratio.147 The FSOC made clear that it was retaining
the flexibility to transition nonbank companies into Stage 2 of the review process
for reasons unrelated to the thresholds. It also stated its expectation that the list
of thresholds would be provisional and subject to updates in the light of future
market developments and regulatory experience.14 8 In Stage 1, then, the FSOC
simply applies an automatic sorting mechanism, and declines to account for firm-
specific information beyond the quantitative thresholds. In light of the
mechanistic, culling nature of this exercise, under the rule the FSOC does not
provide notice to nonbank companies that pass from Stage 1 to Stage 2.
2. Stage 2: The Initial Application of Section 113's Statutory Designation
Criteria
Stage 2 is the first point in the Section 113 process at which the agency
conducts a particularized application of the statutory criteria to a nonbank
financial company under consideration. In Stage 2, the FSOC subjects those
nonbank companies identified during the first stage to a "comprehensive
analysis" in light of the Analytic Framework set forth in the interpretive
guidance,49 taking into account public and confidential information obtained
from regulatory reports as well as any information voluntarily supplied by the
company in question.150 The Analytic Framework itself, discussed in detail
below, represents the FSOC's synthetic gloss on the ten statutory criteria that
Congress set forth to structure the Section 113 designation process.151
146. Id. at 21,641.
147. See id. at 21,660-61.
148. See id. at 21,644.
149. See supra text accompanying note 145.
150. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,642. It is unclear how the
FSOC contemplates that the nonbank financial company being reviewed in Stage 2 could voluntarily
submit materials for the Council to consider if the subject company will only learn of its consideration of
designation after the company has passed from Stage 2 to Stage 3. See infra text accompanying note 152.
151. See supra text accompanying note 71 (discussing statutory ten-criterion
framework).
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3. Stage 3: The Notice of Determination and the Consideration of
Mitigating and Aggravating "Qualitative Factors"
Nonbank financial companies identified during the Stage 2 phase as having
high potential to pose systemic risks to the economy move ahead to the final
Stage 3 review characterized by a formal notice to subject companies and
consideration of a suite of "qualitative" factors that might aggravate or mitigate
the potential systemic threat. Here, the companies first receive formal notice of
the investigation. In its rulemaking, the FSOC refers to this notification as a
"notice of consideration of determination."'152 The FSOC provides companies
receiving this notice with a non-statutory right to "submit written materials"
within thirty days of receipt of the notice, though at this point the company would
have no information other than the rule, the interpretive guidance, and the
knowledge that it is presently under consideration for designation. 1
53
The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 is marked by the notice of
consideration and likely involves an intensified investigation into the subject
company, but the substance of the FSOC's inquiry will remain largely the same;
Stage 3 is simply a continued engagement with the Analytic Framework. The
only substantive difference between the Stage 2 and Stage 3 inquiries is that
during the latter the FSOC will also consider certain "qualitative factors ... that
could mitigate or aggravate the potential of the nonbank financial company to
pose a threat to U.S. financial stability."'1 4 If, following the Stage 3 analysis, the
FSOC decides to move forward with a designation, it will, if it deems it
appropriate, "consult with" and "consider the views" of the company's primary
regulator (if one exists). 1
55
4. Notice of Proposed Designation and the Right to an Administrative
Hearing
If, following any consultation with the subject company's primary
regulator, the FSOC remains resolved to designate the nonbank financial
company, it will then provide the subject nonbank financial company with a
notice of proposed designation. This notice will initiate a thirty-day period within
which the company can exercise its rights under Section 113(e) to request an
administrative hearing to contest the proposed determination, to be held no later
152. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,662; 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(a)
(2018).
153. 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(a)(2) (2018).
154. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,646. See infra text
accompanying note 191 for a more detailed explanation of these "qualitative factors."
155. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,646.
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than thirty days after the company invokes uch rights. 156 The hearing rights are
limited to submission of written materials; the FSOC has sole discretion to allow
for oral testimony and argument. 151
5. The Final Determination
Whether the subject company requests a hearing or not, the next and final
step is for the FSOC itself to determine whether to designate the subject
company. Any final determination to designate a company must be approved by
not fewer than two-thirds of the FSOC members, including an affirmative vote
of the Secretary of the Treasury (in his capacity as FSOC Chair).
158
6. Periodic Reevaluation of Designation
The FSOC has a statutory responsibility to reevaluate each of its
designations "not less frequently than annually."'159 Unsurprisingly, the FSOC
has implemented this requirement by conducting annual reevaluations. The
Section 113 rulemaking simply tracks the statute's requirements and does not
include any meaningful interpretive gloss. In fact, the FSOC does not even
commit in the rule to a specific periodicity of the reevaluation, instead copying
and pasting the "not less frequently than annually" formulation from the
statute. 160
One purpose of the reevaluation is to account for expected organizational
responses to the designations. Section 113 (designation) and Section 165
(heightened prudential standards) alter the decision matrix for a nonbank
financial institution. The regime works a twofold change to their incentive
structures, operating to disincentivize actions that increase the risk of stumbling
onto the FSOC's radar screen16 1 and incentivizing actions to move off the
FSOC's radar screen. This experience of GE Capital was the first case study of
this latter motivation.162 AIG and Prudential provide more recent examples.
163
However, barring a drastic GE Capital-style restructuring, the initial
designation might prove sticky because the same two-thirds majority of FSOC
member agencies that the statute requires for designation is also required to
156. See id; 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(c) (2018); cf Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 113(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e) (2018) (providing the statutory basis for the
hearing right).
157. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(e)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(c)(2) (2018).
158. Dodd-FrankAct § I13(a); 12 C.F.R § 1310.10(b)(2) (2018).
159. Dodd-FrankAct § 113(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(d) (2018).
160. 12 C.F.R § 1310.23(a) (2018).
161. This dynamic is what Dan Schwarcz and David Zaring describe as "regulation by
threat." See generally Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 82, at 1851-53.
162. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the FSOC's rescission of
GE Capital's designation following the latter's transformational restructuring).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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rescind the designation.164 Nevertheless, dramatic alterations in the political
economy of financial regulation, as occurred once the Trump Administration
stacked the Council with deregulatory appointees, can loosen the stickiness of
the designation, as demonstrated in September 2017 when the Council rescinded
the designation of AIG.1
65
Figure 2 below illustrates the sequential procedural features of the Section
113 designation process.
Figure 2
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Noieo pinlFinal
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7. Briefly Revisiting the Question of Organizational Structure: The
FSOC's Five Functional Staff Committees
A brief reprise on the FSOC's structure is necessary to understand the
administrative process contemplated by its final Section 1 13 rule. We have seen
how the FSOC membership (i.e., constituent agency heads) votes for a final
determination, and of course the membership approved the Stage procedures and
the Analytic Framework discussed below through an informal rulemaking. 166
164. Dodd-Frank Act § I 13(d)(2).
165. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE
AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL' s RESCISSION OF
ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (AIG) (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/American-InternationalGroup,_Inc.
(Rescission).pdf [https://perma.cc/HX79-RTZ5].
166. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 595-600 (2014) (describing how informal rulemaking is "by far
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But who performs the work as the Council moves through Stages 1 through 3?
Who, in other words, exercises agency discretion in the application of the
framework in, for example, setting the culling metrics during Stage 1 and
identifying which companies should move from Stage 2 to Stage 3? The statute
and the final rule are both curiously silent on that question.
The FSOC has had to build the organizational scaffolding to perform these
tasks and support the ultimate decisionmakers. To that end, the Council has
established five functional interagency staff committees,167 one of which is the
Nonbank Financial Company Designations Committee (the Section 113
Committee).168 These staff committees are comprised of staff from member
agencies, with each member agency having the right to appoint one or more
representatives to participate in the committee.169 The Section 113 Committee is
responsible for supporting the Council in fulfilling the latter's responsibilities to
consider, make, and review Section 113 designations. 17 A Deputies Committee
comprised of a senior official from each FSOC member agency'11 oversees and
directs the Section 113 Committee, as well as the other functional committees. 
172
Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury, who chairs the Council, maintains a
Secretariat to assist the Secretary in carrying out duties associated with
chairpersonship. 173
the dominant federal model" of administrative policymaking). Formal rulemaking, by contrast, employs
formal trial-like procedures, including oral testimony and cross examination of witnesses. See RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.1, at 561-63 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter PIERCE
TREATISE]. There is nothing informal about informal rulemaking; instead, its procedures, set forth in the
APA, are highly particularized. It is probably better to refer to it as legislative rulemaking, and to refer to
formal rulemaking as adjudicatory rulemaking.
167. See GAO STREAMLINING REPORT, supra note 15, at 68 n.131. The term
"interagency staff committees" originated in the FSOC's bylaws, referred to as its "Rules of
Organization." See Rules of Organization of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY § 6(c)(18) (rev. 2018) [hereinafter FSOC Bylaws]
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FSOCbylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/874H-9MKY].
168. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016
ANNUAL REPORT 107 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/FSOC%/o202016%/o2OAnnual%/o20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZMA-LWW6].
169. See, e.g., Charter of the Nonbank Financial Companies Designation Committee of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT




170. See id. § 1.
171. FSOC Bylaws, supra note 167, § 7(a).
172. See id. (listing among the Deputies Committee's responsibilities "coordinating and
overseeing the work of interagency staff committees"); Section 113 Committee Charter, supra note 169,
§ 3 ("The [Section 113] Committee is subject to the direction and oversight of the Deputies Committee").
173. See GAO STREAMLINING REPORT, supra note 15, at 68. The expenses associated
with the FSOC Secretariat (as well as the independent member of the Council with insurance expertise,
who has no "home" regulator to pay his or her salary) are paid out of the budget for the Office of Financial
Research, a new office established within the Department of Treasury pursuant to Section 152 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 118, 12 U.S.C. §
5328 (2018).
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B. The Basic Structure of the Analytic Framework
This Section introduces in broad strokes the substantive analytic structure
of the Section 113 designation program, as set forth in the Analytic Framework
accompanying the rule. The Analytic Framework tells us how the FSOC will
answer the fundamental question of whether a company could pose a threat to
financial stability. Although the rule's procedural details described above in
Section III.A are obviously necessary to appreciate how this regulatory program
functions, the more consequential (and controversial) elements of the rule appear
in the Analytic Framework. This material is prefatory, setting the stage for a
fulsome exploration of the details and implications of the problems with the
Analytic Framework in the subsequent Parts.
The purpose of the Analytic Framework is to sharpen and focus the FSOC's
core substantive inquiry as initially formulated by Congress. It has the apparent
virtue of setting forth a coherent and comprehensive set of articulable and
analytically distinct inquiries that the FSOC is to undertake when conducting a
Section 113 investigation. On the other hand, it has the obvious vice of being
overly complicated, requiring the agency to consider a confounding admixture
of "categories, metrics, thresholds, and channels" in the course of its inquiry.' 4
1. The Analytic Framework's Interpretation of "Threat to the Financial
Stability": Layering Conjecture on Conjecture
The FSOC's Analytic Framework layers on another layer of conjecture to
the already conjectural statutory task of identifying "threats to the financial
stability of the United States." As noted earlier, the operative logic of Section
113 clearly contemplates that the FSOC must exercise a significant degree of
administrative discretion when implementing and applying the statute. 175 In
particular, the statute plainly requires the FSOC to make hypothetical
assessments of how the future events described by the Determination Standards
might undermine the stability of the financial system. Nowhere is the
intrinsically conjectural nature of the FSOC's designation task more apparent
than in the open-textured phrase "threat to the financial stability of the United
States." In the Analytic Framework, the FSOC embraces this task, in effect
doubling down on conjecture by providing that such a threat exists "if there
would be an impairment of financial intermediation or of financial market
functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict significant damage on the
broader economy."' 176 Parsing this definition, we see yet another nested layer of
conditionality and conjecture.
174. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,660.
175. See supra Section I.B.2.
176. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,657 (emphasis added).
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below update Figure 1 from Section I.B.2 for each
Determination Standard, to include consideration of this added layer of
conjecture.
Figure 3.1 First Determination Standard








Figure 3.2 Second Determination Standard
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2. Building a Conceptual Map of the Analytic Framework
The Analytic Framework revolves principally around conceptual devices
that the FSOC terms "categories" and "transmission channels." In order to
understand the Framework's substantive logic, and how the FSOC orients itself
to its discretionary tasks, one must first become familiar with the potpourri of
conceptual tools the Framework introduces including not only its "categories,"
and "transmission channels," but also its "metrics" and "qualitative factors."
This section will explain how the FSOC uses these other conceptual tools to
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In the Framework, the FSOC deploys two sets of conceptual tools to guide
it through the various Stages'.. of its Section 113 investigations: "categories"
and "transmission channels." The FSOC's six categories are: (1) size, (2)
interconnectedness, (3) substitutability of services, (4) leverage, (5) liquidity risk
and maturity mismatch, and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny.178 The FSOC insists
that it will not apply the categories formulaically and will instead make a
composite Section 113 determination based on "quantitative and qualitative data
relevant to each of the six categories.'17 9 The FSOC refers to the types of data it
will take into account during this analysis as "metrics."'180 Furthermore, it claims
that the categories simply encapsulate the ten criteria outlined in the statute to
provide structure to both determination standards.181
The FSOC states that it intends to apply these "categories" in the contexts
of both Determination Standards.82 However, the FSOC also specifies that the
categories concern the likelihood and impact of a material financial distress (the
predicate factual circumstance for the First Determination Standard), which
makes their application to the Second Determination Standard ambiguous a
matter taken up further below in Section V.B.
The epidemiological concept of contagion or transmission is ubiquitous in
literature on systemic risk, so it is not surprising to see that the Analytic
Framework uses "transmission channels" as a key conceptual tool. The statute
itself is clear that the mere possibility, or even likelihood, of "material financial
distress" at a nonbank financial company does not require designation under
Section 113; instead, the statute directs the FSOC to take action only where such
a failure "could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.'83
The same applies to the firm's mix of activities under the Second Determination
Standard; designation is only proper where those activities could pose a systemic
threat. As noted earlier, the FSOC decomposes this hypothetical inquiry into two
further nested hypothetical inquiries: whether the catalytic circumstance (distress
or activities, depending on the standard) would impair financial intermediation
or financial market functioning in a manner that would be sufficiently severe to
inflict significant damage on the broader economy. 1
84
In imagining how a material financial distress might give rise to a systemic
problem, the Framework identifies three "transmission channels" through which
that catalytic circumstance might transmit negative effects to other firms and
177. See supra Section III.A for a description of the "Stages" of the Section 113 inquiry.
178. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,641.
179. Id. at 21,658.
180. Id. at 21,646.
181. See supra text accompanying note 71 (discussing statutory factors).
182. Id. at 21,658 ("The Council expects to use these six categories to guide its
evaluation of whether a particular nonbank financial company meets either Determination Standard.").
183. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
184. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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markets: (1) exposure, (2) asset liquidation, and (3) critical function-service.'85
These channels are a way of assessing the firm's potential to pose a threat to U.S.
financial stability given its position and role in the broader structure of the
financial system. In contrast to the categories, which describe the characteristics
of a particular firm, the FSOC's "transmission channels" are analytical tools
focused on the position of the firm within the financial system in particular, its
potential to transmit distress elsewhere.
The exposure channel refers to the process by which an outsize exposure
to a nonbank financial company causes failures or disruptions at other financial
institutions. When considering the exposure channel, the FSOC will look at a
series of what it calls "metrics," including consolidated assets, credit default
swaps outstanding, derivative liabilities, total debt outstanding, and leverage
ratio.186 Here, the focus is sensibly not on the magnitude of the aggregate claims
against the company, but the dispersion and density of those claims among a
company's counterparties. The asset liquidation channel addresses the fire sale
phenomenon, pursuant to which a firm liquidates assets, either in connection
with a legally mandated liquidation-resolution proceeding or on its own accord
in order to enhance its liquidity position. The concern here is again, quite
sensibly that a sudden surge in sale orders could cause relevant asset prices to
fall precipitously, disrupting trading in key markets or compromising other firms
that hold the same asset class.'87 Finally, the critical function-service channel is
implicated when a nonbank financial company "is no longer able or willing to
provide a critical function or service that is relied upon by market participants
and for which there are no ready substitutes."'88 Here, the FSOC announced its
intention to "apply company-specific analyses" rather than any "broadly
applicable quantitative metric[s]" in recognition of the "unique ways in which a
nonbank financial company may provide a critical function or service to the
market."'8 9
As a final component of the Analytic Framework, the FSOC will consider,
beginning during its Stage 3 inquiry that is, at a point in its process when
designation is more of a concrete possibility certain "qualitative factors."
Specifically, the FSOC assesses whether these factors "could mitigate or
aggravate the potential of the nonbank financial company to pose a threat to U.S.
185. See Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,641. The FSOC
expressly retained the ability to add further transmission channels to its analysis if necessary. See id. at
21,657.
186. Id. at 21,658; cf supra text accompanying note 180 (noting that the FSOC also
uses "metrics" to refer to types of data it takes into account in consideration of the "categories").
187. See Randall D. Guyrn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 128-29
(2012) (discussing deadweight social loss entailed by "fire-sale liquidations" in the form of reduced
"going concern surplus" and the "increased risk of a severe destabilization or collapse of the financial
system"); Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During a Financial Crisis?, 101
MiNN. L. REV. 1529, 1533-34 (2014) (describing a contagion phenomenon with respect to fire sale asset
dispositions in terms of a "downward spiral").
188. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,658.
189. Id.
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financial stability."' 90 The factors include the company's "resolvability, the
opacity of its operations, its complexity, and the extent and nature of its existing
regulatory scrutiny."' 9'
At this point, a complete picture of the Analytic Framework emerges.
Figure 4 below illustrates the Framework as it presently exists.
Figure 4
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prevent, counteract, or mitigate future harms that are subject to a significant
degree of uncertainty. These regimes, which are described as "risk-regulatory"
regimes, raise hybrid legal-political questions that unavoidably implicate
normative positions that are best conceptualized as outside the legal system.
Except in extreme cases, our evaluation of the merits of arguments about these
issues is largely a function of our attitudes concerning governmental regulation
and discretion. Nevertheless, interested litigants often frame these issues as legal
problems, and they must be confronted as such. The first problem, which I will
refer to as the "Causality Conundrum," is that the Framework makes FSOC
designations susceptible to accusations of arbitrariness because it does not
require probabilistic specification of the causal channels through which a
190. Id. at 21,646.
191. Id.
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systemic problem might hypothetically occur. The second problem, which I will
refer to as the "Regulatory Costs Dilemma," is that the Framework does not
require the FSOC to explicitly and separately account for the anticipated cost
impact of its designations on regulated entities.
The third trenchant problem, which I will label the "Filter Problem," is
really two problems. The "Basic Filter Problem" refers to the fact that the FSOC
has arguably exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a filter that takes into
account the likelihood of financial distress at an investigated company, in the
process narrowing the scope of the Section 113 program. I refer to this filter as
the "Vulnerability-Likelihood Filter" (or the "Filter"). The second, related
problem, which I refer to for reasons detailed below as the "Zombie Filter
Problem," results from the curious fact that no sooner had the FSOC created this
Filter than it disavowed its intention of applying it. So long as the FSOC
maintains this perplexing enforcement stance, it opens its designations up to
challenges on the grounds that the Council is acting arbitrarily by not following
its own protocols.
Each of these problems is also equally applicable to much of the financial
supervisory system, including the most important pillars of the post-crisis
regime.192 Even the Filter Problem, a Section 113-specific problem, is
generalizable to the extent that it sheds light on how the legal system responds
when regulators acquiesce to industry attempts to pare back regulation in
contravention of statutory directives.193 The analysis below therefore presents
the FSOC as a harbinger case study about the coming crisis in the administrative
law of financial supervision.
A. Two Core Potential Risk-Regulatory Problems
Two problems complicate the integration of the Analytic Framework and
similar risk-regulatory programs within today's system of "analytically
managed" administrative law. When regulatory critics attack the first such
problem, which I label the "Causality Conundrum," they take the agency to task
for the alleged imprecision in specifying the causal factors and associated
probabilities that give rise to regulated risks. When they attack the second
problem, which I label the "Regulatory Costs Dilemma," they fault the agency's
decision process for not formally accounting for the costs regulated entities are
expected to incur in connection with the regulatory action.
192. These pillars include the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR)
program and the related Dodd-Frank stress testing program, as well as the review of resolution plans (also
known as "living wills").
193. This phenomenon results from what Charles Lindblom called the "privileged
position" of business interests in a market-oriented political-economic system: policy outcomes inevitably
depend on policymakers successfully inducing business leaders to risk capital, which affords the latter a
privilege that laborers, because their livelihoods depend on their labor, do not enjoy. See CHARLES E.
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 172-77 (1977).
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As noted earlier, for at least three decades, administrative law has
increasingly relied on substantive, instrumental rationality and analytic
management o justify the exercise of administrative discretion.'94 According to
this model of administrative legitimation, agencies validate the exercise of their
discretion by referring to purportedly objective scientific and technical evidence
supporting their decisions to act or not to act.195 This model shares similarities
with the earlier "expertise model" of administrative law, which also made
legitimation depend in part on scientific, technocratic information. 196 However,
they diverge to the extent the analytic management model acknowledges the
political-institutional realities of administration namely, that agency action
cannot be legitimated solely by reference to its adherence to expert disciplinary
methods. 19
7
Instead, this newer analytic management model is predicated on the
institutional management of the analytic methods and information that
contemporary risk regulation regimes require. As under the expertise model, its
methodological forms borrow from science and economics.198 However, its
institutional forms borrow from traditions of American public law, such as
checks and balances and separation of powers. Both Congress (by including
increasingly precise analytic standards into legislation)'9 9 and the White House
(in its centralized review and control of regulatory activity)20 0 have been active
in this process.
Recently, the judiciary has also taken its turn in influencing the analytical
plumbing of administrative process. Courts have admonished agencies that their
responsibility to engage in reasoned decisionmaking requires them to base their
predictive judgments on "logic and evidence" in the record rather than "sheer
speculation' 2 1 and account for the costs of their actions (or inactions).20 2 These
two particular manifestations ofjudicial assertiveness within the broader analytic
management trend threaten to complicate the FSOC's designation process and
other core financial supervisory programs as well.
194. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
195. Cf THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1996).
196. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying note 133.
198. The growing literature on cost-benefit analysis in the legal system is but one
manifestation of this broader trend. See supra notes 134-137.
199. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The "'Reformation of
Administrative Law " Revisited, 31 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 782, 797 (2015).
200. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1758 (2007); Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
201. Sorenson Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
202. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
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1. Potential Risk-Regulatory Dilemma #1:
The Causality Conundrum
The Causality Conundrum makes the FSOC's Analytic Framework
vulnerable to legal attack on the grounds that it fails to require the FSOC to
specify with adequate precision the causal channels through which the
anticipated harm to be avoided will materialize. All risk-regulatory schemes
share a common attribute that co-exists in some tension with the administrative
law desideratum of structured and contained discretion: namely, that the
predicate for regulatory action today is the prospect of a harm that might occur
tomorrow.203 For all but the most mundane matters, the future is subject to a
significant degree of uncertainty; and acting in conditions of uncertainty requires
discretion. Indeed, the requirements for regulatory discretion increase as a
function of the degree to which the regulatory problem is characterized by
uncertainty. The decision space facing an environmental regulator responding to
multi-source air pollution is much wider than it is for a township police
department implementing a traffic regulation system for an intersection. And it
is wider still for a financial regulator seeking to limit the risk that a future,
unknown, and hypothetical distress event at a financial institution might
precipitate breakdowns in the functioning of a future financial system, the
parameters and components of which are presently unknown. Scientific
uncertainty is a constitutive feature of these regulatory regimes; conjecture,
imagination, and hypothesis are unavoidable.20 4
Of course, in its basic form this problem is as old as risk regulation itself.
20 5
It articulates the central challenge of modem administrative law: how to
accommodate the contemporaneous inevitability and toxicity of discretion
particularly the great degree of discretion required by risk-regulatory regimes.
The point here is that the Section 113 program presents a context where the
tension is particularly pronounced. Moreover, lessons from our engagement with
these issues will follow for financial supervision more broadly, since supervisory
programs are increasingly assuming classical risk regulation forms.
2
06
As always, the regulator faces demands to justify its discretionary choices.
What I refer to here as the Causality Conundrum looks at a particular justificatory
203. Cf ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 34 (1992) ("We
become active today in order to prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the problems and crises of
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow or not to do so.").
204. See Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation
and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Administration, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 115 (2000).
205. A trio of mid-1970s scholarly treatments from judges of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit documents the early vigor of these debates. See David L. Bazelon, Coping
with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977); Harold Leventhal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); J. Skelly
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
375 (1974).
206. See Robert F. Weber, The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review and the
New Contingency of Bank Dividends, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 43, 50-51 (2015).
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demand asking the following question: why did the regulator assume that the
future would look like that? The thinner the conceptual thread that causally links
the future harm to the present regulatory action, the more likely it is for a party
aggrieved by that solution to challenge it, either politically (by complaining to
the political branches) or judicially (by casting the ultimate exercise of that
discretion as arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence).
The Causality Conundrum results from the scope of risk-regulatory
legislative directives themselves. The demise of the non-delegation doctrine,
which would otherwise restrict the ability of Congress to delegate to agencies
open-ended legislative tasks, leaves affected parties without recourse against
Congress no matter how broad those delegated discretionary powers are.20
Instead, parties aggrieved by risk-regulatory determinations uch as Section 113
designations have incentives to deconstruct the causal threads the regulator
strives to weave together to support either general rulemakings or particular
adjudications. With this particular regulatory program, the Causality Conundrum
is likely to arise in the context of judicial review of designations.
a. The Causality Conundrum and Congress
Whereas Congress frequently becomes involved in specifying the degree
of definiteness of the causal determinations supporting regulatory judgments, it
did not do so with the Section 113 program. Viewed through the lens of
administrative law qua analytic management, parties aggrieved by regulation can
look to the political branches or to litigation and judicial review. For instance,
aggrieved parties could petition Congress to draft or amend agency organic
statutes so that they mandate that regulation be justified by reference to an
analytic standard requiring a tight causal link between the regulation and the
anticipated harm. Such a standard would require the agency to estimate the
probabilities of the future contingent events on the basis of which the agency
takes action. For instance, a statutory "feasibility" standard might require the
regulator to restrict an environmental pollutant to the extent feasible a standard
that requires the regulator to predict both how the standard will restrict the
pollutant and how it will affect the feasibility of the industry's continuing
operations.20 8 Similarly, a statutory cost-benefit standard might mandate that the
regulator determine that the benefits of regulation exceed, or at least bear a
reasonable relationship to, the costs of regulation.20 9 Such a standard would also
207. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5) (2018) (authorizing Department of Labor to restrict "toxic materials" and "harmful physical
agents" by means of setting the "standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard
for the period of his working life").
209. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 § 9(f)(3)(E), 15 U.S.C. §
2058(f)(3)(E) (2018) ("reasonable relationship"); 49 U.S.C. § 60102(b)(3)-(5) (2018) (requiring the
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require the regulator to specify the causal assumptions and predictive judgments
underlying the analysis.
When it came to setting forth guidelines for the FSOC concerning the types
of future possibilities that might justify SIFI designation, Congress was silent,
deferring to or leaving the problem for the FSOC. Here, the Congressional
silence inoculates the Section 113 program against the threat of potential
designees arguing that the statute itself requires the Council to justify the causal
logic underlying its rulemaking or designations by reference to a specific cost-
benefit, feasibility, or similar standard.2 10
b. The Causality Conundrum and the White House
While the FSOC is unique among financial regulators in that it is subject to
regulatory review by the Executive Branch's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), neither its Final Rules nor its Analytic Framework
have been subject to review. The White House has also asserted itself as a force
to channel regulatory discretion with respect to and, concomitantly, to serve as
a legitimating mechanism for risk-regulatory standards 211 This trend has
obvious implications for risk regulation and the Causality Conundrum, and
aggrieved parties can attempt to profit from White House influence over
regulatory outcomes. Most obviously, starting with the Reagan administration,
each president has required executive agencies to submit regulatory analyses to
OIRA, itself housed in the White House's Office for Management and Budget
(OMB), for review before promulgating new rules or regulations.212 These
reviews are an important piece of a broader effort, implemented by this series of
executive orders, "to reform and make more efficient the regulatory process.21 3
They embody High Church substantive-instrumental rationality techniques.
The focal point of the executive orders is a requirement of executive
agencies to submit a "regulatory impact analysis" (RIA) to OIRA for each
Secretary of Transportation to identify costs and benefits of proposed minimum safety standards
applicable to pipeline transportation of hazardous liquids, and to reach a "reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended standard justify its costs").
210. Cf. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("An agency
is not required to measure the immeasurable, and need not conduct a rigorous, quantitative economic
analysis unless the statute explicitly directs it to do so." (quotation marks omitted)).
211. See Patricia M. Wald, The 1993 Justice Lester W Roth Lecture: Regulation at
Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1994).
212. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) [hereinafter EO 12,866].
213. See EO 12,866, supra note 212. President Obama restored to full effect President
Clinton's Executive Order 12,866, which President Bush had amended without significantly altering the
RIA process. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009) (the Obama order estoring
Executive Order 12,866 as initially promulgated); Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28,
2002) (the first series of Bush amendments); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2736 (Jan. 18, 2007)
(the second series of Bush amendments).
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"significant regulatory action"214 the agency proposes to undertake. The RIA
must set forth the text of such proposed regulatory action, articulate the need for
the action, explain how the action would meet that need, and include an
"assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the regulatory action.' '215 For a
subset of significant regulatory actions namely, those "economically
significant regulatory actions" that would entail $100 million or more in annual
costs a more fulsome report on the proposal is required that (1) includes more
specific information concerning anticipated costs and benefits and (2) identifies
alternatives together with explanations for why the proposal is preferable to those
alternatives.1 6 These exercises require specification of the predictive judgments
underlying the agency's decision to take action.
The FSOC, along with its parent the Department of the Treasury, is unique
among federal financial regulators in that it is subject to OIRA regulatory
review.2'" However, the FSOC contended that the Final Rule and the Analytic
Framework were not "economically significant" regulatory actions and
President Obama's OMB and OIRA concurred. As such, the FSOC was not
required to develop the more fulsome version of an RIA. These determinations,
like any determinations made in furtherance of the OIRA regulatory review, are
committed to the sole discretion of OIRA and OMB and are not susceptible to
judicial review of any kind.21 8 Once the RIA has moved through OMB and
OIRA, White House involvement typically ends. Although the Obama
administration endeavored to institutionalize periodic, retrospective review of
regulations at executive agencies (with OIRA oversight),1 9 such efforts remain
"ad hoc and largely unmanaged.220 Just as importantly, the actual designation-
214. Executive Order 12,866 defines "regulatory actions" to include only generally
applicable statements that the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, thereby excluding
adjudications from its scope. See EO 12,866, supra note 212, § 3(d). A regulatory action is "significant"
if it would have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or otherwise have material
adverse effects, create a serious inconsistency with other action taken or anticipated by other agencies,
materially alter budget impacts of federal programs, or raise novel legal and policy issues. See id § 3(f).
215. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii).
216. See id. § 6(a)(3)(C).
217. Executive Order 12,866 applies only to "agencies," a category the order defined
to include "[any] authority of the United States" that is not identified by the Paperwork Reduction Act as
an "independent regulatory agency." EO 12,866, supra note 212, § 3(b). The Paperwork Reduction Act
includes all federal financial supervisors along with non-supervisory financial regulators the SEC and
CFTC and their independent commission cousins such as the FCC and FERC as "independent regulatory
agencies," thereby excluding them from the scope of the order. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2018) (FDIC,
OCC, Federal Reserve).
218. EO 12,866, supra note 212, § 10; Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1281 (2006). But cf Richard
L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial
Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 594-95 (2017) (clarifying that courts may make substantive
inquiry into analysis submitted to OIRA if the agency later uses that analysis as support for its action).
219. See Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012); Exec. Order
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21,2011).
220. Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG.
57, 59 (2013).
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adjudications themselves, as opposed to the generally applicable Final Rule and
Analytic Framework, would not be subject to OIRA review in the first place.22'
c. The Causality Conundrum and the Courts
For risk-regulatory programs like the FSOC's Section 113 regime,
motivated anti-regulation forces are able to marshal the full force of the Causality
Conundrum in the context of judicial review. Where, as here, a regulator that is
under-instructed by Congress and is not subject o the demanding form of OIRA
review takes an action predicated on its assessment of contingent future events,
the most likely forum in which that assessment will be contested is the judiciary.
If it would be arbitrary (as it must be) for the FSOC to designate a company
under Section 113 on the basis of a scenario involving an alien takeover of the
Federal Reserve Board, the remedy is not presently found in the statute or in the
White House; it can only come from the courts.
As for the Section 113 program, a nonbank financial company could initiate
a judicial challenge to the generally applicable Framework (a rulemaking), or to
an individual designation (an adjudication). A challenge to the rulemaking would
call into question the predictive judgments embedded in the Framework
(arguing, for example, that it is arbitrary and capricious to believe that a 15-to-i
leverage ratio is a meaningful historical level to use as a threshold metric when
evaluating companies for potential designation during Stage 1 review stage). A
challenge to an adjudication would call into question the predictive judgments
embedded in the designation itself (arguing, for example, that it is arbitrary and
capricious to consider a possible liquidity-destroying "run" on life insurance
policies issued by a particular designee because such an event is highly unlikely
to occur).222
The courts are not empowered, in the usual case, to substitute their
judgments for those of agencies. Instead, under the familiar State Farm "hard-
look" review standard, courts will only reverse an administrative decision when
the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.'223 The nettle of hard-look review prods
an agency to premise its actions on "reasoned decisionmaking" rather than
arbitrary or results-driven conjecture and speculation.224 State Farm applies
universally to administrative decisionmaking, but it has special force in the risk-
221. See supra note 214 (explaining that EO 12,866 does not apply to adjudications and
determinations).
222. MetLife, in its challenge to its designation, makes this argument. See MetLife
Brief 50.
223. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
224. Id. at 52.
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regulatory context. Given the inherent contestability of the conjectural
judgments underlying a given risk-regulatory action, affected parties contesting
the action have incentives to engage in "analytical opportunism.""22 They follow
State Farm's lead and criticize agency decisions as inadequately "reasoned" by
raising "important aspect[s] of the problem" and introducing "evidence before
the agency.226
Two considerations conspire to sharpen these incentives. For one, the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine provides that plaintiffs waive
arguments they do not pursue at the administrative level.2 The result is that
plaintiffs will inundate the agency with arguments and evidence during the
adjudicatory phase for purposes of preserving issues for litigation. This strategy
serves the second purpose of putting the regulator on its back foot, in a defensive
posture. Scholars have documented how this strategy, coupled with the
background threat of eventual litigation, at a minimum ossifies the regulatory
process228 and may even predispose regulators, who cannot possibly consider
and filter out all the irrelevant information, to outcomes preferred by regulated
entities.229 These problems apply with particular acuteness to risk-regulatory
decisions predicated on predictive judgments. The amount of information and
data that is arguably relevant to risk-regulatory decisions like Section 113
designations is nearly boundless.
Courts have elaborated how State Farm applies to the predictive judgments
underlying agency decisions concerning future risk states. Courts acknowledge
that "complete factual support" for most conjectural risk-regulatory judgments
is neither possible nor required, and that any "forecast of the direction in which
future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert
knowledge of the agency.'230 As such, an agency possesses the "undoubted
power to use predictive models" in responding to future threats.23' Nevertheless,
when using predictive analytic techniques, the agency must "explain[] the
assumptions and methodology used in preparing the model and provide[] a
complete analytic defense should the model be challenged.23 2 Where an agency
fails to provide a "complete analytic defense" where, in other words, the
agency bases its predictive judgments on "sheer speculation" and not "logic and
225. See ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 121-22 (2007).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 223-224.
227. See Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247-50 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
228. See Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "'Deossifying " the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
229. See Wagner, Filter Failure, supra note 144, at 1328.
230. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (citation
omitted).
231. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
232. Id. (citation omitted).
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evidence" the court has no obligation to defer to the agency.2 33 Courts have
interpreted the largely hollow directive to follow "logic and evidence" to require
agencies to ground their predictive judgments in historical observation, where
such data are present. Agencies have "no license to ignore the past when the past
relates directly to the question at issue.234
The vague terms "speculation," "deductions based on expert knowledge,"
''complete analytic defense," and "logic and evidence" do nothing but invite
contestation. They fail to meaningfully inform State Farm's equally opaque
directive that agencies must engage in "reasoned decisionmaking." None of this
presents an insurmountable problem; judicial interpretation of vague standards
through analogical reasoning is the common law method and administrative
law, notwithstanding ceremonial incantations of its statutory roots, is no
exception.235 In other risk-regulatory contexts, common law decisionmaking has
influenced the ways agencies engage with scientific and other expert
communities. For instance, Fisher, Pascual, and Wagner argue that courts are
involved in a "constructive partnership" with the EPA concerning the latter's
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In that context, the courts serve the
institutional role of a "necessary irritant," disciplining and holding to account the
EPA based on that agency's "own analytical process, methods, and epistemic
frames."236
The Section 113 program, on the other hand, is distinguishable from the
EPA's programs in ways that make it difficult to envisage a constructive role for
courts and judicial review. First, it is an immature program. Common law
methods require courts to analogize new circumstances to an accretive body of
received wisdom. Here, there are no pre-existing administrative-judicial
interactions on which to base decisions. Second, the statutory directive is so
open-ended as to create a nearly boundless decision space for the agency. The
analogy to the fixing of environmental air pollutant standards (itself a highly
discretionary task) is only partially accurate; in reality, the scope of Section 113
discretion is much broader. For one, the EPA is assisted by a Scientific Advisory
Board, which itself composes subcommittees to focus on discrete matters.23
Furthermore, environmental statutes are structurally more cabined than Section
113.
233. Sorenson Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
234. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. FCC, 469 F.3d 1052, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also
id at 1060 ("We cannot overlook the absence of record evidence [supporting the agency's conclusion]
simply because the Commission cast its analysis as a prediction of future trends.").
235. See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1293 (2012).
236. Elizabeth Fisher et al., Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 1681, 1684 (2015).
237. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS
POLICYMAKERS (1990).
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Perhaps a better, but still incomplete, analogy would be to the sweeping
authority bank supervisors have to discipline depository institutions for engaging
in "unsafe or unsound practices" an equally open-ended statutory directive.238
Courts have interpreted that designation broadly to include any imprudent acts
that might result in "abnormal risk" to a bank's financial stability.23 9 In Gulf
Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. FHLBB, the most enduring of these precedents,
the Fifth Circuit discussed how Congress, when it created the authority to issue
cease-and-desist orders on persons undertaking such practices, intended that
power to be a "flexible tool," and proceeded notwithstanding complaints that the
authority would be "too broad" and "unlimited. '240 However, even there, most
(but not all) courts have grafted on a proximate causation limitation (i.e.,
"reasonably foreseeable") onto the "unsafe or unsound practice" designation.4'
Nearly all safety and soundness litigation occurs in an ex post setting, after an
institution has been placed in receivership and the receiver is seeking recovery
from the persons responsible for the institution's demise, or the supervisor is
seeking penalties or prohibition orders against those same persons. The context
is remedial litigation, not risk regulation. The "reasonably foreseeable" tort
model works well in that context; the court assesses the damage and then
enquires into the responsibility of the allegedly responsible defendant. In other
words, facts and history conspire to focus the court's attention, with the benefit
of hindsight, on one particular world state: what actually occurred. Section 113,
on the other hand, is entirely forward-looking and prophylactic.
So neither environmental regulation nor ex post bank safety-and-soundness
litigation provide good models for courts in thinking about how to think about
the Causality Conundrum in the context of Section 113 and other financial
supervisory programs. Pointing to the FSOC's virtually boundless decision
space, companies objecting to the Framework or particular designations on
causality grounds will demand that the Council justify in detail its discretionary
judgments concerning the causal roots of the risks the Council seeks to prevent.
Again, these demands will take the form of arguments that the FSOC generate
and respond to large quantities of information concerning financial distress and
its likely effects, preferably with probabilistic data. Indeed, that was a core pillar
of MetLife's case against its designation: in its summary judgment brief, MetLife
238. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2018) (providing authority to issue cease-and-desist
orders).
239. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Kaplan v. OTS, 104 F.3d
417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Greene Cty. Bank v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Seidman,
37 F.3d 911, 932 (3d Cir. 1994); Nw. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1990);
Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 263-65 (5th Cir. 1981).
240. Gulf'Fed Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 651 F.2d at 264.
241. See Kaplan, 104 F.3d at 421 ("Any such risk must of course be reasonably
foreseeable."); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 651 F.2d at 264 ("The breadth of the 'unsafe
or unsound practice' formula is restricted by its limitation to practices with a reasonably
direct effect on an association's financial soundness."). But see Greene Cty. Bank, 92 F.3d
at 636 (rejecting defendant bank's argument that the statute only covers practices "having
a reasonably direct effect" on a bank's financial soundness).
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argued that "a risk analysis that does not meaningfully examine both the
probability and magnitude of harm is no risk analysis at all. 242 The brief quotes
heavily from technical risk analysis literature, faulting the FSOC for not
conducting a rationalized, formalistic, numbers-based analysis consistent with
that discipline.243
Again, this tactic is unsurprising; there are strong incentives for those
affected by risk-regulatory determinations to frame their objections as
informationally intensive allegations of arbitrariness.4 4 The problem is that the
tactic will present a conundrum for courts. First, there is active technical debate
concerning the usefulness of probabilistic assessments of financial catastrophe
due to the limited data and constantly evolving and open environment in which
risk might materialize.245 Furthermore, once we view Section 113 and financial
supervision more broadly with a risk regulation lens, we appreciate the
normative implications of regulatory decisions, as well as a "whole series of
methodological, epistemological, and even ontological problems inherent in
determining the level of danger" that are obscured by the myopic focus on
objective risk-related data.246
To take just a few examples, what does it mean to pose a "threat" to the
"financial system"? What should be a polity's tolerance to catastrophe within its
financial system? And what exactly is the system the government seeks to
preserve? Does the answer to that latter question refer to discrete financial
functions, existing distributions of financial assets, or something else? As
undeveloped as these normative issues are in risk regulation more broadly, they
have gone entirely unexamined in the context of financial supervision. The
FSOC (and financial regulators more broadly) have little to no experience in
dealing with these issues when compared to other risk regulators. They therefore
are unable to take advantage of the developed if still incomplete legal
doctrines, methodological forms (statistical value of a human life, statistical cost
of carbon), and institutional forms (scientific and citizen-focused advisory
committees, inter-agency working groups) that have informed traditional risk-
242. MetLife Brief, supra note 120, at 35.
243. See id; cf Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection, 2
EUR. J. RISK REG. 125, 125-28 (2013) (recounting how the "risk assessment/risk management framework
has become the dominant account of risk regulation").
244. See supra text accompanying notes 228-229.
245. Compare John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015), and Patricia A. McCoy, Knightian Uncertainty,
Systemic Risk Regulation, and the Limits of Judicial Review (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 2944297 [https://perma.cc/G8JM-KAJU] (warning
courts against "requiring FSOC to make statistical projections that are impossible to make with
confidence"), and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Callfor Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351 (2014), with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in
Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. Si (2014) [hereinafter Posner & Weyl I], and Eric A. Posner &
E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
393 (2013) [hereinafter Posner & Weyl II], and Revesz, supra note 218, at 600.
246. Fisher, supra note 204, at 115.
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regulatory praxis. Instead, an institutional quagmire is more likely to result at
least in the short term with courts and financial supervisors drawn into an
analytic management exercise for which both institutions are presently ill-
equipped.
2. Potential Risk-Regulatory Dilemma #2:
The Regulatory Costs Dilemma
Yet another developing trend in judicial oversight of risk-regulatory
determinations will likely complicate the work of the FSOC and other financial
supervisors in the coming years. Specifically, courts have invalidated regulatory
actions as arbitrary and capricious where the regulator's decision process does
not formally account for the costs regulated entities are expected to incur in
connection with the regulatory action. In each of its designations to date, the
FSOC has opted not to take into account the costs the designated firm would be
expected to incur as a result of the designation.
This line of argument is related to, but ultimately distinct from, the ongoing
theoretical debate about how and to what extent marginal cost-benefit analysis
should be used as an informational tool or even a primary legitimating
criterion in financial and other regulatory systems.24 As a doctrinal matter,
there is presently no general requirement that agencies demonstrate that the
benefits of proposed agencies actions outweigh their costs.24 8 Executive Order
12,866 does require Executive Branch agencies to submit to OIRA cost-benefit
analyses of all proposed rules and guidance documents that include point
estimates of the expected costs (along with the expected benefits) associated with
the particular proposed action. Nevertheless, the setting in which the analysis
operates is more political than legal; the decision whether to proceed with a given
action is a political decision negotiated between the White House and the agency.
And although some agency statutes require cost-benefit analysis, these statutes
are rare, and at any rate, they do not include the FSOC's organic statute.249
247. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. Shapiro and Glicksman use the
descriptor "marginal" to refer to those requirements that agencies demonstrate that benefits exceed costs
as a firm precondition to agency action. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 132, at 40.
248. In April 2017, bipartisan Senate sponsors introduced the Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2017, which would impose a requirement on independent agencies to submit a
regulatory impact analysis (with accompanying quantification of costs and benefits) to OIRA before
promulgating economically significant rules or guidance. See S. 951, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017). Unlike
Executive Order 12,866 which, again, simply imposes a procedural requirement to conduct an analysis
with no judicial review concerning compliance or the substance of the analysis the legislation would
make the regulatory impact analysis (including the point estimates of costs and benefits) subject tojudicial
review. See id. § 4.
249. See supra note 210 and accompanying text; cf Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating the SEC's proxy access rule because the Commission's organic
statute, which required it to consider the effects of a proposed rule on "efficiency, competition, and capital
formation," failed altogether to "determine the [rule's] likely economic consequences" by not quantifying
expected costs (or explaining why quantification was unnecessary)).
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The FSOC has argued that the text of Section 113 supports its authority not
to consider costs because the statute only requires the FSOC to consider, in
addition to the statutorily enumerated factors, other factors that "the Council
deems appropriate." The FSOC's plain meaning argument would appear to put
the Council on firm footing; the statute quite apparently vests discretion in the
FSOC to "deem" what factors are "appropriate" and what factors are not.
How that plain meaning argument will fare in court depends in large part
on how the court interprets the Supreme Court's 2015 case Michigan v. EPA. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by failing to consider the costs that power companies would incur as a result of
the agency's decision to regulate oil- and coal-fired plants.2 50 Enacted as part of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Act required
the EPA to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants by power plants if the
EPA "finds ... regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the
results of [a statutorily-mandated] study."
251
In 2012, the EPA made an "appropriate and necessary" finding after
reviewing the results of its study concerning mercury.252 As an Executive Branch
agency, the EPA, it will be recalled,253 is required to prepare a regulatory impact
analysis, but that statement is not formally part of the actual rulemaking; it is
instead an ancillary, adjunct report to OIRA for purposes of coordinated
Executive Branch review of regulatory activity. In its regulatory impact analysis,
the agency estimated that the new regulations would impose $9.6 billion in
annual compliance, monitoring, and reporting costs on the power industry. In
making the final appropriate-and-necessary determination in the rulemaking, the
EPA disclaimed any obligation to consider these costs.2 54 Instead, the agency
found regulation "appropriate" because power plant emissions of mercury, a
substance for which emission-reducing controls were available, posed a risk to
human health and the environment. The EPA found regulation to be "necessary"
because no other provision in the Clean Air Act eliminated those health and
environmental risks25
The Supreme Court invalidated the EPA's power plant mercury rule
because the agency's interpretation of the statutory "appropriate and necessary"
language to exclude consideration of costs was outside "the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.' ' 5 Noting the "capaciousness" of the term "appropriate," the
250. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
251. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). The statute
was silent about what such "regulation" was to consist of, but the agency has interpreted it to apply the
same "floor standards" applicable to major sources and area sources.
252. See 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 214-216 (discussing requirement hat
Executive Branch agencies submit regulatory impact analyses to OIRA for proposed rulemakings).
254. Supra note 252, at 9,326-27.
255. Id. at 9,363.
256. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
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Court held that it "requires at least some attention to cost.'257 Despite pointing
out that "appropriate and necessary" might reasonably be read not to encompass
cost in some contexts, the Court held that cost was a necessary part of any
analysis as to the appropriateness or necessity of regulation.258 The opinion links
the association between regulation and costs to State Farm hard-look review: "an
agency may not 'entirely fai[l] to consider an important aspect of the problem'
when deciding whether regulation is appropriate.259 In a dictum likely to
provide fresh ammunition to anti-regulatory arguments in the coming years, the
Court speculated that "[o]ne would not say that it is even rational, never mind
'appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few
dollars in health or environmental benefits.260
A Section 113 designation is distinguishable from the "appropriate and
necessary" determination underlying the EPA's mercury rule in several
potentially important respects. First, the Court held that the EPA erred in its
interpretation, rather than its application, of its statute. In other words, Michigan
v. EPA is a Chevron case. The problem was that the agency staked out a formal
position that its statute forbade it to consider costs when gauging the necessity
and appropriateness of regulation of power plants that "cost [was] irrelevant to
the decision to regulate."'26' The FSOC has taken no such interpretation. A
second distinction relates to the first: no statutory language analogous to the
Clean Air Act's "appropriate and necessary" phrase obviously cabins the
FSOC's discretion not to consider costs. Nevertheless, the Michigan v. EPA
Court's characterization of cost considerations as a necessary component of
"rational" regulatory policymaking invites the reader to untether Michigan v.
EPA from the narrow context of the Clean Air Act (and its "appropriate" phrase)
and apply it more broadly. After all, an "irrational" explanation of agency action
would hardly pass the general APA arbitrary-and-capricious test, no matter what
the specifics of the statutory authorization were.262
The point here is that the FSOC is on contestable terrain when it disclaims
a legal obligation to quantify costs. Michigan v. EPA hardly provides a clear
answer for the Section 113 program, but it does provide a clear reminder that the
status of cost considerations is unsettled. The same observation could be made
with respect to most discretion-heavy financial supervisory regimes that do not
formally account for costs including the capital adequacy regimes for banks
and insurance companies, the Federal Reserve's stress testing and
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citation omitted).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,374 (1998) ("Not
only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which
it reaches that result must be logical and rational."); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 978-79 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("The 'arbitrary and capricious' standard deems the agency action presumptively valid provided
the action meets a minimum rationality standard.").
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comprehensive capital analysis and review (CCAR) programs, and bank safety-
and-soundness upervision more broadly.
B. The Filter Problem
This Section will explain how the FSOC likely acted illegally by including
the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter in the Analytic Framework. However,
contemporary standing doctrine will likely bar any effective judicial challenge
to remediate the Filter Problem, which benefits potential designees and
counteracts the purpose of Section 113 itself. Worse still, the Filter Problem,
once safely buried into the Analytic Framework, acquires a second life as a
Zombie Filter Problem, owing to the FSOC's curious disavowal of its intention
to apply the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter. This position significantly
undercuts the legality of the FSOC's designation practice by giving to its
opponents grounds to argue that the Council is acting arbitrarily and capriciously
by failing to enforce its own guidance and rules.
By requiring the FSOC to take into account the extent to which an
investigated company is vulnerable to material financial distress, the Filter
excludes from the universe of potential designees those companies that are
deemed unlikely to experience financial distress even where that unlikely
distress, were it to transpire, could credibly precipitate turbulence in the financial
system. By so doing, it operates to the collective advantage of regulated parties
and disfavors regulatory beneficiaries such as competitors, counterparties,
consumers, and taxpayers those who might benefit from regulation but are "not
[themselves] the subject of the contested regulatory action. 263
Financial industry members initially proposed the Filter to the Council
during the rulemaking process. By acceding to their request to add the Filter, the
Council bestowed a benefit on potentially regulated entities, in the process
possibly compromising its regulatory mission to curb systemic risk and harming
regulatory beneficiaries. In analyzing the Vulnerability-Likelihood Filter, a
curious and perhaps counter-intuitive observation emerges: despite the clamor
about regulatory overreach on the part of financial industry firms, the
Framework's most trenchant flaw results in significant under-regulation
compared to what the statute seems to require. The Basic Filter Problem refers
to the possibility that Congress never intended to authorize the FSOC to so
restrict its deliberative process. This phenomenon is common in financial
regulation, so the below analysis should be read as an invitation to apply this
analysis to other regulatory programs.
263. Clarke v. Sec. Ind. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987); see generally Nina A.
Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397
(2007) (discussing the role and incentives of beneficiaries of regulatory policymaking).
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Barring a decision on the part of the Council to revisit this issue (or a
directive from Congress requiring it to do so), the most straightforward mode of
redress for regulatory beneficiaries would be judicial review.
However, this Section will outline three reasons why judicial review is
unlikely to prove an effective institutional setting for the remediation of the
Problem. These reasons include the APA's statute of limitations and the
inhospitable posture of current standing doctrine to judicial challenges initiated
by regulatory beneficiaries. But perhaps the most significant barrier to judicial
resolution of the Basic Filter Problem is that the FSOC has puzzlingly stated its
intention to disregard it. That is, the FSOC insists, contrary to the express and
clear terms of its own Framework, that it does not consider likelihood of financial
distress as part of its deliberation process. This practice largely renders the
Problem non-justiciable, at least for present purposes.64 But even as this practice
obviates the Basic Filter Problem (at least as a proper subject forjudicial review),
it creates another problem in the form of the Zombie Filter Problem. It invites all
future designated companies to argue that the Council has resolved not to apply
its own Framework in ways that transparently prejudice designated companies
a cohort that, unlike regulated beneficiaries, has keen incentives and inarguable
standing to challenge their designations. And because the APA statute of
limitations for an adjudication like a Section 113 designation would run from the
date of the designation, it would present no obstacle.
1. The Merits of the Case Against the Filter
This Basic Filter Problem results from the Framework's possible
divergence from the statute, not from any internal inconsistency in the Analytic
Framework. In other words, the problem is not that the FSOC, in structuring its
deliberation process, has settled on a problematic means of channeling its
discretion; instead, the problem is that it might have exercised discretion that
Congress never granted to it in the first place. As is well familiar by now, Section
113 itself authorizes the FSOC to designate a nonbank financial company if it
determines that a material financial distress at the company could pose a threat
to the financial stability of the United States.265 A plain meaning reading of that
statute suggests that the agency must assume that a material financial distress is
occurring at the company, and determine whether such a distress event could
have the required effect. The implicit legislative logic underlying this
interpretation is that since any private firm could by definition fail, Section 113
would ensure that a supervisory apparatus would be in place for any company
264. Of course, the Council could always alter its enforcement practice, which would
activate the Basic Filter Problem as a subject for judicial review. Indeed, the Treasury Designation Report
recommended that the FSOC start to apply the filter. See TREASURY DESIGNATIONS REPORT, supra note
97, at 11.
265. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 113(a)(1), 12
U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1) (2018).
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whose failure could precipitate the policy problem Congress wanted to
counteract: i.e., compromising the financial system.
And yet, in the face of this plain meaning analysis, the FSOC
accommodated industry efforts to introduce likelihood of material financial
distress into the Analytic Framework. In the first notice of proposed rulemaking,
the FSOC noted that among commenters, "there was a consensus that risk
management practices be factored into the assessment of a nonbank financial
company, because they are a key factor in determining theprobability of material
financial distress."266 A number of commenters importuned the agency to
include in its framework not just "an assessment of the likelihood of a firm's
failure having a material impact on the financial system," but also "an assessment
of the likelihood that it could experience material financial distress.26
After considering these comments, the FSOC, in its first notice of proposed
rulemaking, introduced six "categories" as conceptual tools to guide it through
the various Stages268 of its Section 113 investigations: (1) interconnectedness,
(2) size, (3) substitutability of services, (4) leverage, (5) liquidity risk and
maturity mismatch, and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny.269 In describing them,
the FSOC stated that "each of the proposed categories reflects a different
dimension of a firm's potential to experience material financial distress."2 0
In the second notice of proposed rulemaking, the FSOC inserted the
explanation, also embodied in the final guidance as noted earlier, that three of
the "categories" leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing
regulatory scrutiny "seek to assess the vulnerability of a nonbank financial
company to financial distress."27 1 The FSOC singled out leverage and maturity
mismatch as destabilizing factors at the institutional level, again focusing on the
likelihood of material financial distress: "Nonbank financial companies that are
highly leveraged, have a high degree of liquidity risk or maturity mismatch, and
are under little or no regulatory scrutiny are more likely to be more vulnerable
to financial distress."2 2
Again, this focus on a company's vulnerability to financial distress (or the
probability or likelihood thereof) does not appear in the statute. The notices of
proposed rulemaking make clear that the FSOC incorporated these
considerations as an accommodation to industry commenters. As a practical
266. First FSOC Section 113 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 143, at 4,558.
267. Id. at 4,556.
268. See supra Section III.A for a description of the "Stages" of the Section 113 inquiry.
269. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,641.
270. First FSOC Section 113 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 142, at 4,560.
In its final rule and guidance, the FSOC walked back from this characterization, as implied from the earlier
discussion of the FSOC's position that only the first three categories (leverage, liquidity risk, and maturity
mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny) are meant to assess the likelihood of a material financial
distress. In the process, it gave birth to the Category Problem. See infra text accompanying note 391.
271. Second FSOC Section 113 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 143, at
64,278.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
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matter, it introduces another incremental inquiry into the Section 113
deliberation process, and therefore it contracts the universe of companies that
could be subject to designations.
The creation and application of the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter gives
rise to an administrative law question: did the FSOC have authority to so restrict
the statute's application? Doctrinally, the answer will depend on the familiar
Chevron rule,2 7' which recognizes an agency's interpretive authority with
respect to matters for which its organic statute has not clearly specified a contrary
treatment.4 The Chevron deference approach "is premised on the theory that a
statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps."'275 In the arm-wrestling match over
interpretive authority between courts and agencies, Chevron applies force to the
latter's elbow. The rule is justified on the grounds that agencies are better
situated than courts to resolve statutory indeterminacy due to their superior
expertise and greater political accountability.
276
Traditionally, courts have applied a two-stage test under Chevron, asking
first whether the relevant statute is ambiguous and, secondly, if it is, whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable. Where a court finds that the statute is
unambiguous, there is no room for agency discretion, and the court will simply
apply the statute.2 Recently, courts and commentators have identified an
additional analytic inquiry in the framework, sometimes referred to as "Chevron
Step Zero."2 8 With Step Zero, a court considers whether it is inappropriate to
273. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U .S. 837 (1984).
274. The "doctrinally" qualification is necessary because empirical studies have
established that the framework does not shift interpretive discretion from courts to agencies nearly as
much as expected. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090
(2008) (finding that the Supreme Court did not apply any deference at all in 53.6% of its post-Chevron
cases involving an agency interpretation of a statute, and that it instead "relie[d] on ad hoc judicial
reasoning of the sort that typifies the Court's methodology in regular statutory interpretation cases");
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 968, 984 (1992)
("Paradoxically, it appears that adoption of the Chevron framework has meant, if anything, a decline in
deference to agency views."); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?:
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) (finding that the degree of judicial
deference in Supreme Court cases discussing Chevron depends on the ideological orientations of the
deciding justices); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent:
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727,
1751 (2010) (building on an earlier study to determine what variables motivate Supreme Court justices to
apply Chevron and other "deference regimes"); cf Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (pointing out that the doctrinal implications of Chevron
amount to a "counter-Marbury" rule pursuant to which agencies, rather than courts, interpret ambiguous
or incomplete statutes).
275. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000).
276. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (noting that under Chevron, the "agency armed with the
very expertise and political sensitivity courts lack may (so long as it meets a requisite level of decision-
making formality) adopt any policy permitted by the scope of statutory indeterminacy").
277. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231-32 (2005).
278. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190-92 (2006).
Yale Journal on Regulation
find an implicit delegation of interpretive authority because the context would
have required Congress to make any such grant express.
279
So how would the FSOC's decision to impose the Likelihood-Vulnerability
Filter fare on the merits under Chevron? First, the "Step Zero" analysis would
likely not impede the adoption of the Filter. Nothing in the FSOC's statute would
suggest that Congress clearly would not expect the FSOC to develop
mechanisms for filtering the universe of designable companies. To the contrary,
if it does nothing else, Section 113 clearly contemplates a filtering exercise built
on several layers of ambiguous statutory terminology.
Moving to the next step, is Section 113 ambiguous when it comes to
considerations of vulnerability to distress? The legality of the Likelihood-
Vulnerability Filter would hinge on the answer to this question. A plaintiff might
advance the plain meaning argument that the statute clearly contemplates that
the FSOC must assume the material financial distress is already occurring.28
That is, the statute provides that if a material financial distress could pose a threat
to systemic stability, then designation is appropriate. If an institution is too large,
or if it maintains an irreplaceable presence at crucial nodes of the financial
system, such that its failure poses a threat to the system's continued operation,
then it should be supervised and perhaps even coerced into downsizing or
restructuring its operations. The argument would stress that likelihood is
addressed on the back end by the Federal Reserve and its Section 165 enhanced
supervisory regime, not on the front end by the FSOC. In other words, the
Federal Reserve might very well decide to focus its supervisory resources on
firms presenting greater likelihood of experiencing distress.28'
In making the determination to assume material financial distress, the
Congress, as with every legislative item, apparently assessed the net costs, risks,
and benefits associated with such a rule and decided to proceed.2 82 The costs
associated with such a rule flow from the risk of overbroad application. A
Section 113 program without the Filter would apply invariantly to all
279. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2,480, 2,488-89 (2015). Note also that Step
Zero is confusing to the extent it suggests Step Zero is analytically prior to the question concerning
statutory ambiguity. Step Zero might be more appropriately termed Step One-and-a-Half because it
operates as a check on the court before finding an implicit grant of interpretive authority to the agency
a circumstance only applicable after a court has determined that the statute itself is ambiguous and does
not expressly address the matter.
280. Cf. Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988) (rejecting the Secretary of
Labor's claim that a statute was ambiguous and invalidating a rule governing criteria for black lung benefit
claims); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L. J.
511, 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and
from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists.").
281. See Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32
L. & POL'Y 181, 185 (2010).
282. This description privileges a sort of normative representational model of
lawmaking. It could be adjusted to adopt a normative pluralist account (in which the legislature responds
to constituent preference sets) or a descriptive interest group account (in which the legislature responds to
political demands of powerful, organized interests) without affecting the analysis that follows.
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systemically important firms and would, at least at the margin, impose
compliance costs and restrictions on firms that are unlikely to experience
financial distress. Consequently, those firms swept up in the Section 113 net,
along with those who fear being so swept up, might eschew providing services
and credit that would otherwise promote social welfare. Interpreted thusly, the
statute would seem to reflect a congressional determination that the benefits of
crisis avoidance exceed these potential downsides and to express an
unwillingness to consider the possibility that any single company's collapse
might precipitate a financial crisis. Not only would such a policy be reasonable,
it is also consistent with the weight of the policy discussion in the lead-up to
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
283
On the other hand, the FSOC (and the potential designees that benefit from
the Filter) might argue the statute is ambiguous with respect to the status of
material financial distress. It would respond that Congress, by declining to define
material financial distress expressly, implicitly granted discretion to the agency
to define the term, which describes a condition that is inherently a matter of
degree and not susceptible to binary classifications. Such an argument would
then point out that the indeterminate nature of the material financial distress
concept means that Congress could not have entailed an automatic, mechanistic
application of the Section 113 test. A further argument would contend that it is
impossible to conceive of a future, hypothetical material financial distress
without taking into account the actual circumstances through which distress
might materialize a task that naturally lends itself to consideration of the
likelihood that those circumstances present themselves. Otherwise, there would
be no principled way for the FSOC to exclude from Section 113, for instance,
the possibility that aliens engineer a hostile takeover of Citigroup and direct
investment bankers to eliminate or waive covenants from all loan documentation.
(Of course, the plain meaning mavens would say, "So what if the scenario is
unlikely? The problem is that the malevolent aliens would know they could go
straight to Citi to collapse the system because Citi was too big!").
Finally, some of the statutory factors themselves might be argued to
contemplate consideration of the likelihood of distress.284 For example,
paragraph (a)(2)(H) of Section 113 requires an assessment of existing regulatory
scrutiny.7 The FSOC might plausibly argue that the primary focus of such a
criterion is to account for the ability of pre-distress supervision to reduce the
likelihood of distress.286 In the case of insurance-focused businesses, state
283. See supra Section L.A (discussing how the FSOC was intentionally structured to
fill regulatory "gaps" such as the lack of supervision of systemically significant firms).
284. MetLife made this argument before the district court. See infra notes 368-370 and
accompanying text.
285. See infra text accompanying note 395.
286. See Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reform of the Supervisory System and High
Reliability Theory, 50 GA. L. REV. 249 (2015) (distinguishing regulation that promotes ex ante
anticipation of crisis from regulation that promotes ex post containment of crisis, and arguing that post-
crisis environment has privileged the former).
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insurance supervisors eek to minimize the risk of failure at least at the
operating company level so as to protect policyholders and restrict access to
state guaranty funds. Still, a plaintiff would have a ready retort: the consideration
of existing scrutiny sheds light on the necessity of consolidated federal
supervision, not the likelihood of financial distress. That is, where the Council
determines that any material financial distress (irrespective of its likelihood)
might pose a threat to systemic stability, it might nevertheless determine it would
be inadvisable to impose consolidated federal supervision because there is an
existing apparatus in place to police the company.
On balance, our putative plaintiff should have the weightier arguments as
to the unambiguous nature of the statutory command, although not nearly so
obviously as to preclude the possibility of a court coming to a good faith contrary
determination. In any event, if the statute is ambiguous as to the question of
whether the agency can consider the likelihood of material financial distress,
then it is hard to see how a plaintiff can win on the merits of Chevron Step Two.
It is plainly reasonable to do so by incorporating consideration of leverage,
liquidity risk, maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny at potential
designee companies. These considerations are key determinants of a nonbank
financial institution's vulnerability to financial distress.28
The foregoing analysis suggests that, despite all the clamor against the twin
perils of excessive agency discretion and regulatory overreach, the Analytic
Framework might actually be illegal on account of its regulatory modesty and
narrow reach. The important point here is that the FSOC, by introducing the
Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter into its Analytic Framework, exercised
administrative discretion to accommodate the short-term economic interests of
potential designee companies.2 88 It could just as easily have eschewed
likelihood-of-financial-distress considerations altogether and proceeded directly
to an analysis of the effects of a distress. In doing so, the agency arguably acted
contrary to its statute, opening itself up to a potential judicial correction that
would operate to streamline the Analytic Framework and expand the universe of
potential designees.
287. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014); Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift in Life
Insurance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to Principles-Based
Reserving, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 35, 46-48 (2011) (comparing the dangers to insurance companies and
banks arising from maturity mismatch and liquidity risk); Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Regulatory Reform, Remarks at The Clearing House 2014 Annual
Conference (Nov. 20, 2014).
288. The use of "short-term" descriptor here acknowledges the obvious incremental
compliance costs associated with layering on a level of consolidated Federal Reserve supervision where
none existed before. Of course, the long-term effects of such supervision are presently unknowable.
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2. Standing Doctrine Complicates a Judicial Challenge to the Basic Filter
Problem
Current standing jurisprudence likely would foreclose an attempt to redress
the Filter Problem through judicial review. If we side with the plain meaning
proponents and interpret Section 113 to require the FSOC to assume material
financial distress, the Basic Filter Problem emerges as a bona fide legal problem
for the FSOC. That problem could be remedied one of three ways: (1) Congress
could amend the statute to clarify that vulnerability and likelihood considerations
are irrelevant to the designation; (2) the FSOC could amend the Analytic
Framework to clarify the same; or (3) a plaintiff could attempt to obtain judicial
redress under the APA. If Congress and the FSOC decline to change the policy
and resolution requires judicial review, an analytically prior question requires
attention: is there a potential plaintiff with both the incentive to raise the issue
and standing to prosecute its resolution in the courts? Before analyzing these
related questions289 of regulatory postures and incentives, on the one hand, and
standing on the other hand, some conceptual splitting will help to clarify the
issues. This Article is not the forum for an exegesis on the notoriously
complicated administrative law standing doctrine,290  but some general
observations are necessary in order to understand how a legal challenge to the
Basic Filter Problem might arise. Four distinctions frame the analysis below: (1)
regulated entity vs. regulatory beneficiary; (2) competitor beneficiary vs. non-
competitor beneficiary; (3) constitutional standing vs. statutory/prudential
standing; and (4) adjudication vs. rulemaking.
The analysis set forth below leads to three conclusions. Firstly, potential
nonbank Section 113 designees lack the incentive to seek a judicial remedy to
the Basic Filter Problem. Secondly, non-competitor beneficiaries of the Section
113 program such as consumers and taxpayers have the incentive but lack
standing. Thirdly, competitor beneficiaries of the program such as large bank
289. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (requiring federal courts to
satisfy themselves that "the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the [plaintiffs] alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This
is the gist of the question of standing.").
290. In issuing this qualification, I follow the tradition of abjuring attempts to formulate
a scientific summation of standing law in the administrative context. Cf. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as
such."); 3 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 166 § 16.1 at 1401 ("[S]tanding law suffers from inconsistency,
unreliability and inordinate complexity .... It is impossible to reconcile all of the majority opinions of
the Court that purport to announce tests and decisional criteria that lower courts must follow."); Hearings
on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.
498 (1966) (statement of Prof Paul A. Freund) (describing the concept of standing as "among the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law"); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 258 (1961) (explaining how standing analysis often bleeds into
merits analysis).
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holdings companies have both the incentive and standing to raise a judicial
challenge (although we will see that statute of limitations will render judicial
redress for such a plaintiff unavailable). Consequently, present standing doctrine
complicates traditional judicial resolution of the problem because the parties
with the keenest interest in remedying the problem (i.e., regulatory beneficiaries)
likely lack standing to pursue the matter in the courts. And this dilemma is hardly
unique to the FSOC and Section 113; current standing doctrine creates a one-
way ratcheted reservoir of discretion for agencies to accommodate the interests
of regulatees (who almost always have standing), often at the expense of
legislative objectives and regulatory beneficiaries (who frequently lack
standing). Here again, the Section 113 program serves as a case study for other
financial regulatory programs.
a. Regulated Entities vs. Regulatory Beneficiaries: The Former
Have Standing, But Lack the Incentive, to Challenge the Filter
This first distinction (regulated entities vs. regulatory beneficiaries) is
important because we can note at the outset that the former always will have
standing to seek judicial review over administrative actions that harm them.29'
Having said that, what they possess in ability they lack in motivation. An actual
or potential Section 113 designee would be unlikely to raise a legal challenge to
the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter because the Filter can only lower the
probability of its designation.292 If such a company has not yet been designated,
it is in its interest to keep the Filter in place; if it has been designated, the Filter
would have no causal relationship with that regulatory fact. Instead, a challenge
would have to come from a litigant who wants to expand the program's coverage.
Two sets of regulatory beneficiaries would be expected to have such an
interest. First, competitors of potential designees, such as large regulated banks
and their holding companies, would likely desire to promote an even supervisory
playing field with respect to their nonbank financial institution competitors.293
291. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (observing that
where the "plaintiff is himself an object of the action," there is "ordinarily little question that the action
or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it").
292. This characterization is subject to the qualification that an existing Section 113
designee might conceivably contest the application of the Filter to exclude a sectoral competitor. Such a
potential challenge would be complicated by the lack of a final reviewable action and the related principle
in favor of unfettered enforcement discretion on the part of agencies. See infra Section IV.B.2.d.
293. There is a long history of this sort of regulatory litigation to police inter-sectoral
boundaries and competition within the financial industry. See, e.g., Sec. Ind. Ass'n v. Bd. of Govs. of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1986) (securities industry trade association contesting bank entry into
commercial paper underwriting business); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (upholding mutual
fund industry complaint that OCC approval of bank mutual fund sales violated Sections 16 and 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 150 (1970) (data
processing servicers trade association contesting OCC decision to allow national banks to offer such
services); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (insurance trade association contesting
OCC approval of Citibank's formation of a subsidiary to offer municipal bond insurance); Clarke, 479
U.S. at 388 (securities industry trade association contesting bank entry into discount brokerage business).
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Specifically, they might be expected to seek to impose consolidated supervision
(with the accompanying activity restrictions, and capital and liquidity
requirements) analogous to the supervisory restrictions they face.294
Alternatively, non-competitor regulatory beneficiaries might also be
expected to litigate such a case. The statute intends that this class of actors will
indirectly benefit from the direct regulation of others in this case, designated
nonbank companies.29 5 Public interest advocacy groups representing consumer-
taxpayer-citizen regulatory beneficiaries, such as Better Markets Inc., might be
eager to remove the imposition of an illegal filter. Here, the motivation would be
to reduce the probability that a nonbank financial company could, like Lehman
Brothers and AIG in 2008, escape meaningful consolidated supervision and play
a role, as either catalyst or accelerant, in a new financial crisis that would erode
the value of assets, require government bailouts, and depress employment and
economic activity.
b. Competitor Beneficiaries vs. Non-Competitor Beneficiaries: The
Former May More Readily Establish Standing Than the Latter
These regulatory beneficiaries identified above might have the incentive to
challenge the legality of the filter, but do they have standing? Since the 1970s,
administrative law standing doctrine has required a plaintiff suing a government
agency to establish two jurisdictional prerequisites.96 The first prerequisite is
constitutional in nature, resulting from Article III's limitation of the federal
"judicial Power" to "Cases" and "Controversies.2 9  The second prerequisite,
alternatively referred to as a "statutory" or "prudential" requirement,298 further
limits standing to those plaintiffs whose injuries are "arguably within the zone
of interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute in question.2 99 The
purpose of the statutory-prudential requirement is to screen out cases brought by
regulatory beneficiaries to remedy injuries for which the statutory scheme
obviously does not contemplate judicial redress.300
294. This is particularly true in light of the developing "enhanced" section 165
prudential standards applicable to large bank holding companies. See supra notes 42-53 and
accompanying text.
295. See Mendelson, supra note 263, at 414.
296. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1983)
(noting the jurisdictional nature of standing inquiry).
297. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 881 (1983).
298. Since most instances ofjudicial review of administrative activity arise pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act and agency organic statutes, it usually suffices to refer to this additional
requirement as "statutory" in most administrative law cases. Nevertheless, this non-constitutional
"complementary rule of self-restraint" applies equally to petitions for judicial review alleging injuries not
arising out of particular statutes, in the administrative context and more broadly. Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
299. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (citation omitted).
300. See Clarke v. Sec. Ind. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) ("[T]he test denies a right
of review if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit
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I will return to consider how these two standing requirements would apply
to a potential judicial challenge to the Basic Filter Problem by a regulatory
beneficiary, but the second distinction (competitor beneficiary vs. non-
competitor beneficiary) sets the stage for that analysis by addressing a
preliminary concern: namely, that third-party regulatory beneficiaries normally
face a hurdle to establishing standing. As the Supreme Court noted in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, "when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish."3 0'
This competitor/non-competitor distinction is important because the
former most obviously, regulated banks and their trade associations clearly
would possess standing to challenge the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter. Courts
routinely affirm that regulatory beneficiaries qua competitors of regulated
entities have standing to redress the competitive harm resulting from the failure
of agencies to apply and follow laws restricting the activities of the regulated
entities. The result of this "competitor standing" doctrine is that, in most cases,
a competitor of a regulated entity will satisfy both the constitutional and
statutory-prudential standing requirements.302
Furthermore, this litigation could be initiated and directed not only by
individual plaintiff competitors, but also by trade associations. In the case of
trade associations, their standing is associational and representational; it derives
from the standing of the association's member entities.30 3 The availability of
associational standing solves the collective action problem that otherwise might
inhibit individual plaintiffs from challenging unlawful agency action or
inaction.30 4 Interestingly, many of the key doctrinal reference points for standing
jurisprudence arose from lawsuits brought by financial service trade associations
(e.g., mutual funds, insurance companies, information technology providers)
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."); id. at 389
(further interpreting the "zone of interests" prong to inquire into "whether Congress intended for a
particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge an agency's disregard of the law"); Ass'n of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 150 (1970).
301. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 758 (1984)).
302. La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also
United Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 913, 919 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). Statutory-prudential considerations will only
frustrate standing for such a competitor plaintiff where that plaintiff's interest is "antithetical" to the
"statutory purpose" of the law the agency allegedly violated. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners
Ass'n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
303. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp. Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (noting, inter alia, that "associational standing" is but "one strand" of a broader
doctrine of "representational standing").
304. See Mendelson, supra note 263, at 413. For instance, an individual regulatory
beneficiary would likely have to finance the initiation and prosecution of the lawsuit (e.g., attorney fees,
expert witness fees) on its own. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1 )(A) (allowing for recovery of fees by plaintiffs
in litigation against government agencies only if the court finds that agency position was not "substantially
justified").
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against bank regulators to dispute agency actions that liberalized inter-sectoral
competition by permitting banks to participate in formerly restricted activities.05
c. Constitutional Standing vs. Statutory-Prudential Standing: Courts
Are Hesitant to Recognize the Standing of Non-Competitor
Beneficiaries
If competitor beneficiaries nearly always possess tanding, the situation is
less favorable for non-competitor beneficiaries (such as individual citizens,
consumers, taxpayers, or public interest organizations that represent hem). The
constitutional standing requirement calls for the plaintiff to establish an "injury-
in-fact" that is, an injury that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.30 6 Furthermore, the plaintiff must
show that the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"
and that "it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.'30 7 Together, these form a tripartite
framework: a plaintiff must show (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) caused by the
challenged agency action or inaction, (3) that can be redressed through judicial
review.
Like magnets repelling their opposite pole, two doctrinal factors have
combined over the past twenty-five years to push most non-competitor
beneficiaries away from constitutional standing. First, courts are increasingly
unwilling to recognize standing for plaintiffs to redress "generalized grievances"
concerning government acts through the judiciary.30 8 Second, courts have balked
at the prospect of recognizing "probabilistic standing" premised on an injury in
the form of an uncertain, hypothetical, conjectural future harm.30 9 The first
problem implicates the injury-in-fact analysis, and the second problem
implicates the causal analysis. These problems complicate not only suits brought
by individuals and single legal entities, but also suits initiated by citizen
advocacy groups and trade associations in their representative capacities.3 10
305. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
306. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000). The gloss on the injury-in-fact requirement that the injury or threat must not be
"conjectural" or "hypothetical" originated in the 1983 case City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102
(1983), in which the Supreme Court cited to a series of cases from as early as 1923 that had used the terms
in the standing context. By the 1990s, the language had become a de rigueur statement of the law in any
case addressing constitutional standing. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560.
307. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81.
308. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009).
309. See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1123 (2005); F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 55 (2012).
310. Advocacy groups could, on the other hand, attempt to assert organizational
standing, which requires a heavy burden of proof: "[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the
organization's activities with [a] consequent drain on the organization's resources constitut[ing] ...
more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests." Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders
v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Organizational standing is premised on a direct interest of the
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These developments evolved from the risk regulation revolution of post-
1960s American government. That period generated new forward-looking risk-
regulatory programs, particularly in the environmental, public health, and
workplace safety arenas. As the administrative state along with the Congress
that created it and sustains it focused its attention on regulatory policy aimed
to control and manage future risks, standing doctrine underwent an expansionary
phase.31' Indeed, the impetus to democratize the regulatory process and
reinvigorate moribund New Deal agencies through increased public
participation3 12 was of a piece with the legislative zeal to expand this new risk-
regulatory administrative state in an effort to make government more responsive
to citizens' priorities.3 13 Liberalized standing for citizens to challenge
bureaucratic errors was a partial antidote to the perceived problem of regulatory
sclerosis that prevailed at the time,3 14 and Congress's seemingly boundless
appetite for new regulatory legislation meant that citizens had more opportunities
than ever before to call their government to account before courts.
Several decades later, the Court began to retrench from its permissive
posture,315 exercising the "passive virtue" of judicial restraint by denying
standing more frequently.3 16 In doing so, it was motivated by a fear that
organization, rather than a derivative, representational interest. It is exceedingly unlikely that an advocacy
group could meet his standard in connection with a challenge to the Basic Filter Problem or indeed, a
challenge to any financial regulatory act. As an illustration, a U.S. district court dismissed for lack of
organizational standing a case brought by a public interest group to challenge the Department of Justice's
enforcement decision to settle a civil case against JPMorgan Chase & Co., the largest financial institution
in the United States. See Better Mkts., Inc. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015).
311. For illustrative examples of this phenomenon, see, e.g., United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Office of Commc'ns of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Comm. v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). For scholarly analysis, see, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 85-86 (1989) (highlighting standing as one of
several aspects of a "remarkable transformation in American politics ... in the middle decades of the
twentieth century" in the form of a "redistribution of political access"); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035-
36 (1968); Stewart, supra note 131, at 1723-47.
312. Standing was only one part of a much broader trend toward increased participation
by citizen interest groups in the regulatory process. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 560 n.57 (2000); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public
Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1620-21 (1985).
313. In a related phenomenon, Congress itself increasingly provided for express
statutory rights to bring citizen beneficiary suits to enforce risk-regulatory legislation. See Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 192-93 (1992). Indeed, the legal literature
is prone to overstating the role of the judiciary and understating the role of Congress in realigning the
relationship between the government and the economy in the 1960s and 1970s. See Rodriguez &
Weingast, supra note 199, at 784 (making, not illustrating, this observation).
314. See Sunstein, supra note 313, at 183-84.
315. See Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution
Follow the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 699-700 (2010). The 1980s and 1990s can be viewed as a
period of judicial disinclination to interfere with administrative agencies and the executive branch more
generally. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1041 (1997).
316. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1965)
(discussing how "devices of not doing," including standing, constitute the passive virtues ofjudiciary).
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liberalization of standing rules for regulatory beneficiaries had disrupted the
balance of powers in American government. The Court complained in Lujan that
then-prevailing notions of standing had enabled "the courts ... to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal
department... and to become virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action.' Quoting from the 1944 case Stark v.
Wickard,3' 8 the Lujan Court harkened back to an earlier period in which courts
weighed in on matters of administrative government "only to the extent
necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action
fairly beyond the granted powers. '319 The Court specified that "individual rights"
did not include "public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong
to each individual who forms part of the public. '320 The implication was that
there was no constitutional authority for courts to enforce an "abstract, self-
contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the.., law."
321
This judicial disinclination to redress undifferentiated, generalized injuries
is most evident in the historically litigation-rich context of environmental law,322
but the same principle should apply to other risk regulation regimes including,
most obviously for our purposes, financial regulation.323 The wider the class of
injury sufferers, the less likely one of its representatives will have standing.324
Consider the examples of a taxpayer qua regulatory beneficiary of Section 113
(that is, a person who benefits from a regime in which bailouts with public funds
are unlikely) or a finance consumer qua regulatory beneficiary of Section 113
(that is, a person who generally enjoys the continuity of supply of financial
317. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
318. 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
319. Id.
320. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. Note that the Court's concern here was not merely that it
should abjure on justiciability grounds interpreting, for instance, a vague constitutional principle. Instead,
Lujan stands for the proposition that courts should avoid asserting federal jurisdiction to redress general
grievances even where Congress has expressly empowered the regulatory beneficiary to bring a lawsuit
in federal courts. See id at 571-72 (describing the citizen suit provision from the Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), before ruling it unconstitutionally broad).
321. Id. at 573.
322. See Danieli Evans, Concrete Private Interest in Regulatory Enforcement:
Tradable Environmental Resource Rights as a Basis for Standing, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (2012).
323. The principle is also established in the context of taxpayer standing. See
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (holding that standing for a plaintiff taxpayer
challenging the constitutionality of government grants to hospitals required plaintiff to show that "he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally"). Derogations from
this general principle show up in the jurisprudence, but they are difficult to reconcile with the weight of
precedent, and it is best to consider them as context-specific anomalies. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 24 (1998) (citizen standing to challenge FEC regulation, despite "generalized" and "widely shared"
nature of injury to all voters, because the injury's relationship to voting, "the most basic of political rights,"
was "sufficiently concrete and specific" to establish standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
(taxpayer standing to challenge violations of Establishment Clause).
324. Since the standing of an association derives from the standing of its members, the
same result obtains with respect to the association. See supra note 303 (discussing associational standing).
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services and credit without disruption). Both of these plaintiffs, whether acting
on their own or through an association,325 will almost certainly lack standing
because his is a "generally available grievance about government claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large.326
Even if a plaintiff can credibly allege a concrete and particularized injury,
it will find yet another precedential booby trap complicating its access to the
courts. Specifically, the current jurisprudence is inhospitable to plaintiffs seeking
redress for bureaucratic errors giving rise to hypothetical future harms, risks, and
dangers. The U.S. Constitution and the legislation establishing the Article III
federal judiciary together empower courts to hear cases in equity, which includes
lawsuits seeking prospective injunctions to enjoin future injuries resulting from
current violations of law. 2 Of course, many of the bureaucratic tasks involved
in modem government require conjectural, hypothetical determinations about
future harms that are inherently contestable and contingent. Nowhere is this more
evident than in financial supervision and examination. For instance, the intrinsic
regulatory logic of Section 113 is that Congress has entrusted the FSOC to make
conjectural, speculative, future assessments about how turbulence in the
financial system might emerge. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
incanted that in order to maintain standing, a plaintiff's injury resulting from
these determinations must not be "conjectural or hypothetical.'328 The net effect
of this case law channels contestation about regulatory process away from the
courts and into the political process.
The 2009 case of Summers v. Earth Island Institute is instructive. In that
case, the Supreme Court faced a plaintiff's challenge to the U.S. Forestry
Service's decision that it would not provide for public notice, comment, and
appeal with respect to projects involving land tracts smaller than 250 acres.329
The only evidence plaintiff introduced that could establish a prospective injury
was an affidavit from a member of the plaintiff organization who claimed to be
aggrieved by the comment policy change because he could no longer seek to
persuade the Service concerning the development of these smaller tracts of
325. If, on the other hand, these interested potential pl intiffs are able to mobilize a state
government to spearhead the litigation, then standing will likely disappear as a problem. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Lisa Heinzerling, Massachusetts v. EPA, 22 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 301, 310-11 (2007). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that Massachusetts, in its
capacity as an intervenor, had standing to sue under the Clean Air Act to challenge the EPA's refusal to
promulgate greenhouse gas emissions standards. In support of its decision as to standing, the Court stated
that "[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it
was in Lujan, a private individual." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; see also id. at 520 (observing
that sovereign states were "entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis").
326. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
327. See Hessick, supra note 309, at 61.
328. See supra note 306 (discussing the genesis of the carve-out of "conjectural or
hypothetical" injuries from constitutional standing).
329. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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protected lands. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing. The problem,
according to the majority, was that the causal thread linking the policy change to
the plaintiff's future harm was too speculative:
Here we are asked to assume not only that [the affiant] will stumble across a
project tract unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the tract is about
to be developed by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational
interests, and that he would have commented on the project but for the
regulation.
330
In other words, in the Court's view the problem with seeking redress in the
judicial system was that courts exist to remedy injuries that are both concrete a
specifically traceable to a regulatory action.331 The injury was hardly illusory,
but the causal nexus linking the alleged bureaucratic error to that injury was too
tenuous. However likely (or even probable) the future harm was, standing would
not lie if the plaintiff required the court to imagine a series of hypothetical causal
scripts through which the harm materialized.332 The majority expressly rejected
the dissent's preferred "realistic threat" approach criticized as a "probabilistic
standing" approach333  which emphasized instead the concreteness of the
likelihood of future harm, even where the precise manner by which it
materializes is uncertain.334 Here the legal system draws on the familiar
distinction between probability and risk, on the one hand, and uncertainty, on the
other hand, to apportion legal entitlements and direct judicial resources in ways
that harm regulatory beneficiaries.
This jurisprudence deals non-competitor beneficiaries of financial
supervisory regulation a losing hand. Even more than the Earth Island plaintiff,
a non-competitor regulatory beneficiary of a financial supervisory program
330. Id. at 496.
331. In the earlier case of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
the Court had held that a regulatory beneficiary need only establish a "reasonable concern" that the
challenged action would have a particularized, direct adverse effect on the would-be plaintiff. Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 183-84. In that case, the Court held that a plaintiff conservation association had standing to
challenge defendant's non-compliance with a consent order entered by a state environmental regulator
due to the former's members' "reasonable concerns" that "the effects of [the defendant's] discharges"
would "directly affect[] [their] recreational, aesthetic, and economic nterests." Id. While Earth Island
Institute did not overrule Laidlaw, the two cases certainly stand in tension with one another. See Bradford
Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, But a "'Realistic Threat " of Harm
Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89, 137 (2010).
332. The subtext of this restrictive view of standing is, of course, that the plaintiff can
seek redress through the political system by prevailing upon the legislative and executive branches
concerning the projected causal conduits through which the harm, danger, or risk will materialize.
333. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. at 499-500.
334. Id. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A] threat of future harm may be realistic even
where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates, and GPS coordinates."). The dissent quoted
approvingly from the Court's opinion in Los Angeles v. Lyons, which provided that a plaintiff could
establish a "realistic threat" (and establish his standing to sue to enjoin the use of an allegedly
unconstitutional police choke-hold) if he could show that the hold would cause him harm "in the
reasonably near future." 461 U.S. at 102 (1983).
Yale Journal on Regulation
would allege an injury arising out of a causal environment that is entirely
insusceptible to definite specification. It is not merely that such a plaintiff would
be unable to specify when an event occurs, as with, for instance, a string of four
consecutive "heads" flips of a coin an event that is certain to occur, even if the
precise sequence of flips is uncertain. With financial supervisory programs
focused on systemic risk, the causal specifications of the harm a plaintiff suffers
depend on complex and reflexive interactions among the financial system, the
wider economic system, and the political system. The narrative linking the
complained-of agency action in this case, imposing an illegal barrier to Section
113 designation for some firms to the harm plaintiff will suffer requires
imagining at the very least that: (1) the FSOC would designate additional firms
were the filter removed; (2) failure to designate these firms would contribute to
their experiencing financial distress; and (3) the financial distress would cause a
systemic breakdown of the financial system through specified channels.
Indeed, the plaintiff must ask the court to imagine further contingencies that
link the systemic stress to that particular plaintiff. For instance, a consumer
plaintiff might have to show that it will suffer from the disappearance of funding
that otherwise would be available. And a taxpayer-citizen plaintiff might have to
convince a court that the government would likely take specified remedial
actions in response to the systemic stress (e.g., bailouts, prolonged interest rate
cuts, fiscal stimulus). It is one thing to ask the FSOC to perform these tasks;
indeed, that is exactly what Congress did. According to the current
jurisprudence, it is another thing altogether to ask the courts to engage in this
"ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.335
The dubious constitutional standing of non-competitor regulatory
beneficiaries alleging generalized grievances premised on uncertain future harms
largely moots any analysis of their statutory-prudential standing. After all, the
two requirements are conjunctive and the courts apply the statutory-prudential
test only after they consider the plaintiffs constitutional standing.336
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness it bears mentioning that courts have
been more receptive to claims of non-competitor statutory standing than claims
to constitutional standing, owing to a presumption in favor of statutory standing
that requires a defendant o demonstrate congressional intent to preclude judicial
review. 7 The presumption contemplates a dynamic, functional conception of
congressional intent, focusing not only on the plaintiffs status as an actually
"intended beneficiar[y]" at the time of the statute's enactment but also including
335. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
336. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 504
(1998); cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (referring to Article III injury-in-fact analysis as "a
core component of standing").
337. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567
U.S. 209, 225 (2012) ("We apply the [statutory-prudential standing] test in keeping with Congress's
evident intent when enacting the APA to make an agency action presumptively reviewable." (quotation
marks omitted)); 3 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 166, § 16.9 at 1521.
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plaintiff interests that are "sufficiently congruent with" the interests of the
intended beneficiaries.338
Courts have found sufficient evidence of an intent to preclude where a
plaintiff suffering an economic injury sought to invoke statutory rights intended
to protect the environment339 or where a union alleging injury from
anticompetitive behavior on the part of a multi-employer association sought to
bring a lawsuit premised on antitrust laws intended to promote consumer
interests.340 In Lujan, the Court included a hypothetical illustration of an agency
defendant that decides, in contravention of its statute, not to conduct an
evidentiary hearing.34' Such a defendant, the Court continued, could rebut the
presumption if a stenographer sued it alleging an injury in the form of a lost
opportunity to provide stenographic services; Congress obviously did not intend
to benefit stenographers when it enacted the statute requiring the agency to
conduct evidentiary hearings.342
For purposes of the "zone of interests" inquiry, the statutory provisions in
question include not only the APA's judicial review statute, but also the FSOC's
broader statutory scheme.343 The APA, of course, quite plainly contemplates a
right of review for "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.34 4 And the entire FSOC
statute, set forth in Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, is intended to "respond to
emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system' 345  a
regulatory charge that equally benefits all users of finance as well as wider arrays
of economic actors benefiting indirectly in their capacities as employees or
taxpayers. Read together, these statutes in no way suggest a statutory logic to
preclude the ability of consumers, citizens, and taxpayers to initiate judicial
review of agency action adopted pursuant thereto.346 Of course, for reasons
alluded to above, this conclusion likely provides cold comfort to public advocacy
338. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 988 F.2d 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
339. See Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2005)
(National Environmental Policy Act).
340. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983).
341. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
342. See id.
343. See 3 PIERCE TREATISE, supra note 166, § 16.9 at 1516; cf Clarke v. Sec. Ind.
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 401 (1987) ("[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which [plaintiff]
sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes.").
344. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018); cf Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012).
345. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1 12(a)(1)(C), 12
U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(C) (2018).
346. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984) ("[T]he presumption
favoring judicial review [is] overcome ... whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review
is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."' (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)).
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groups, who face gusty headwinds in their efforts to establish constitutional
standing when challenging financial supervisory actions.
34
d. Agency Adjudication vs. Agency Rulemaking: Any Judicial
Challenge to the Filter Problem Will Likely Be Framed in Terms
of Judicial Review of the Analytical Framework, Not an Agency
Adjudication
For all the focus in the standing jurisprudence on types of plaintiffs, it is
crucial to remember that "it is the injury and not [the] party" on which standing
ultimately depends.348 Discussing standing in terms of plaintiff typology,
particularly when specific categories of plaintiffs are associated with specific
types of injury, helps identify which legal persons are proper conduits through
which a legal issue arrives before the court. For example, as we saw above, given
the structure of the Section 113 regulatory program, citizen advocacy groups will
face great difficulty in establishing constitutional standing to challenge FSOC
action or inaction.34 9 Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it should be borne in
mind that a plaintiff must identify an injury that the plaintiff has suffered or will
suffer. This reminder will focus the analysis for those categories of plaintiffs,
such as competitors,35 0 with stronger arguments for standing.
The injury-based focus of standing doctrine implies a further principle: the
standing analysis will also depend in part on the way the plaintiff frames and
characterizes the bureaucratic error giving rise to the injury. A challenge to
agency action can assume one of two forms: judicial review of agency
rulemaking or judicial review of agency adjudications. The APA defines the
terms "adjudication" and "rulemaking" such that they include mutually
exclusive categories of all types of administrative actions.351 Although the
distinction matters in certain contexts,3 52 for purposes of the APA judicial
standard of review, both adjudications and rulemakings fall within the category
of "agency actions, findings, and conclusions," so the familiar arbitrary-and-
capricious standard would apply equally to Section 113 rulemakings and
adjudications.353
347. See supra notes 306-3 10 and accompanying text.
348. Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
349. See supra notes 306-3 10 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Section IV.B.2.b.
351. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7).
352. For instance, a party to an adjudication, whether formal or informal, has a statutory
right to appoint counsel or an authorized representative in connection with the proceeding. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 555 (2018).
353. Interestingly, the Dodd-Frank Act might provide that courts are to use the
"substantial evidence" standard when reviewing a FSOC designation under Section 804 that is, a
designation of an FMU for supervision by the Federal Reserve. See supra note 29 and accompanying text;
Dodd-Frank Act § 804(c)(2)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5463(c)(2)(C) (2018). I say "might" because the Act invokes
the "substantial evidence" phrase in a curious manner. It provides to a potential designee a right to
"demonstrate that the proposed designation or rescission of designation is not supported by substantial
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Although the standard of review might be the same, incentives are such that
the rulemaking setting is likely to provide a more workable setting than the
adjudication setting for judicial review of the Basic Filter Problem. The FSOC's
organic statute provides for judicial review of final determination orders,354 and
the APA provides for judicial review only of final agency actions.355 These
statutes codify the bedrock principle that he means by which an agency enforces
its policies are committed to the agency's absolute discretion.35 6 In the normal
course, the only way the FSOC takes a reviewable agency action is to designate
a nonbank company; as a result, there is no reviewable action in connection with
its decision not to designate any particular company or groups of companies
whether on account of a perception that financial distress is unlikely or
otherwise. Nevertheless, the issue might be ripe for consideration in the possible
(although to-date unprecedented) event that the FSOC rescinds an in-force
designation on the specific grounds that the designee is no longer sufficiently
vulnerable to financial distress.35
Instead, a facial challenge to the Analytic Framework itself a final agency
action in the form of a rulemaking would present a more likely vehicle for
judicial review of the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter. An interested party with
standing (such as a competitor) could bring a lawsuit under the judicial review
provision of the APA, alleging that the introduction of a potential designee's
vulnerability to material financial distress into the FSOC's inquiry is arbitrary
and capricious. The ultimate outcome of such a lawsuit will depend on whether
the courts incline toward the plain-meaning, expansive reading or the contextual,
restrictive reading of the statute.35 8
evidence." Id. The statute therefore instructs the FSOC, rather than a reviewing court, to employ the
standard. In any event, the distinction matters because the Supreme Court has characterized the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard as "more lenient" than the "substantial evidence" standard, which the APA
prescribed only for trial-like formal rulemaking proceedings. See Am. Power Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power
Svc. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983). But see Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 880 n.19
(9th Cir. 2004) ("When the arbitrary and capricious test is performing that function of assuring factual
support, there is no substantive difference between what it requires and what would be required by the
substantial evidence test.") (citation omitted); Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 950 n.3 (7th Cir. 1983)
(ascribing the difference between the tests "more to atmospherics than to the patently demonstrable").
354. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(h), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h) (2018).
355. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
356. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that "an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion").
357. See supra Section 111.6 (explaining (i) the requirement that FSOC periodically
reevaluate its designations and (ii) the recent designation rescissions for GE Capital and AIG on grounds
unrelated to the Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter).
358. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the merits).
Yale Journal on Regulation
3. The Statute of Limitations Likely Bars Any Attempt to Redress the
Filter Problem by Attacking the Framework Itself
Just as we have identified a possible redressable injury and plaintiff with
standing namely, a competitor beneficiary challenging the Analytic
Framework we come before another hurdle: the statute of limitations. A six-
year statute of limitations applies to judicial review of actions against the
government such as actions pursuant to Section 702 of the APA and the
Section 113 judicial review statute359  for which Congress has not provided an
alternate statute of limitations in the applicable statute.360 While a facial
challenge to the Framework brought by a competitor plaintiff benefiting from
the Section 113 program presents the most effective vehicle for challenging the
Likelihood-Vulnerability filter, such a litigant would have had to have filed a
suit before April 2018 the point at which the six-year period ran out.
Nevertheless, a competitor regulatory beneficiary might be able to obtain
judicial review by invoking its rights under § 553(e) of the APA. That provision
allows "any person" to petition an agency to issue, amend, or repeal a rule; in
response, the agency must justify any denial of a petition with a statement of
reasons. 36' The petitioner has the right to seek judicial review of an agency's
denial.362 However, the APA does not require the agency to respond to a § 553(e)
petition by any particular time. Furthermore, although refusals to adopt the
requested administrative action are susceptible to judicial review, "such review
is extremely limited and highly deferential.363
4. How the FSOC's Curious Refusal to Apply the Filter Renders a
Judicial Challenge Unlikely, But Also Creates a New "Zombie Filter
Problem"
Having reviewed the foregoing explication of the Basic Filter Problem, the
reader will likely be surprised to learn that the FSOC, in each of its designations
to date, has disavowed any intention of applying the filter in the first place. In
the introductory material explaining the basis for each of its designations to date,
the FSOC has included the following perplexing qualification:
The Council's final determination does not constitute a conclusion that [the
company] is experiencing, or is likely to experience, material financial distress.
Rather, consistent with the statutory standard for determinations by the Council
under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Council has determined that
359. See supra note 78 and accompanying text discussing § 113(h).
360. See, e.g., Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 781 F.3d
1271, 1285-86 (11 th Cir. 2015).
361. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2018).
362. See id. § 702.
363. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
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material financial distress at the company, if it were to occur, could pose a threat
to U.S. financial stability.
364
So long as the FSOC maintains a consistent policy of eschewing
deployment of its potentially illegal filter, a judicial challenge to remedy the
Basic Filter Problem will likely be non-justiciable because no potential plaintiff,
not even a competitor beneficiary, will have suffered an injury-in-fact. However,
as discussed below, the Council's inclusion of the Likelihood-Vulnerability
Filter creates a further complication that is ripe for judicial review in this case,
by the designated companies themselves.
But no sooner have we safely interred the Basic Filter Problem, than the
problem re-emerges, zombie-like, in a different guise to create new problems for
the Council. Whether the inclusion of the Filter in the Analytic Framework was
legal or not, by not applying it, the FSOC has opened itself up to criticism on the
part of designated companies that the Council is acting arbitrarily by failing to
apply its own rules.
MetLife seized upon precisely this issue in its lawsuit challenging its
designation. In its motion for summary judgment, MetLife attacked the
application of Section 113 and the Analytic Framework alleging an
administrative impropriety that amounts to a spin-off of the Basic Filter Problem.
Specifically, MetLife argued that the FSOC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
not considering MetLife's vulnerability to financial distress. At least half of that
statement is unassailable; as noted above, the FSOC expressly disavowed any
intention, much less a requirement, to consider MetLife's vulnerability to such a
state.365 The other half of that argument that MetLife acted arbitrarily and
capriciously is only partly meritorious (but meritorious enough to justify
rescission of the designation).
First, MetLife advanced a statutory argument, claiming that its designation
violates the express terms of Section 113. Agency action in contravention of an
explicit Congressional dictate is the quintessence of administrative
arbitrariness.3 66 On the other hand, if the FSOC used its discretion to interpret its
ambiguous statute, it is entitled deference from the judicial branch under
Chevron.361 MetLife argued that the FSOC plainly stated that several of the
statutory factors specifically, the extent of pre-existing regulatory scrutiny, a
364. E.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL'S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife/o20Public%/o2OBasis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MD9-U8V9].
365. See supra text accompanying note 364.
366. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) ("Reviewing courts are not
obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem
inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.");
Pub. Citizen v. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (vacating final agency
rule where on arbitrary-and-capricious grounds the agency "wholly failed to comply with [a] specific
statutory requirement").
367. See supra notes 273-287 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron deference).
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company's use of leverage, and a company's liability structure are relevant to
the question of whether material financial distress is likely to occur.368 As
discussed above, that much is correct.369
However, MetLife takes the further step of interpolating from the possible
relevance of those factors to the likelihood issue a congressional directive
requiring the FSOC to assess likelihood in its investigations. The Basic Filter
Problem refers to the possibility that the FSOC has violated its organic statute
by including vulnerability to financial distress as a screening factor, rather than
simply assuming the existence of a material financial distress. But MetLife's
argument here is altogether different, claiming in effect that vulnerability and
likelihood are transparently necessary that FSOC violates its statute by
excluding their consideration when applying its framework. (This argument can
only apply to the application of the Framework and not directly to the Framework
itself, which, as discussed at length above, does in fact provide for the
Likelihood-Vulnerability Filter).
The flaw in MetLife's argument is that the statutory factors to which
MetLife refers, while certainly relevant to a discussion of likelihood of financial
distress, are equally relevant to the question of how distress might transmit
through the financial system. Companies that employ significant degrees of
financial leverage, operate largely outside of regulatory scrutiny, and fund
themselves with short-term liabilities present heightened risks of transmitting
distress, once it does occur, through the exposure and liquidation channels. From
a financial theory perspective, the argument that inclusion of such considerations
in the statute makes it arbitrary for the agency not to look at likelihood on the
grounds that the considerations can only be relevant to likelihood is fatuous.3
Nevertheless, underneath the flaws in MetLife's statutory argument lies a
troubling implication. Although the statute itself does not require consideration
of the likelihood of financial distress, the FSOC did in fact decide to include it
in its Analytic Framework.3 1 Here, MetLife's second argument has bite.
Specifically, it argued that the FSOC, in announcing its intention to eschew
consideration of MetLife's vulnerability to financial distress in applying its
368. See MetLife Brief, supra note 120, at 26-28.
369. See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
370. MetLife also argues that the binary determination standards implicitly presuppose
that the First Determination Standard requires assessment of the likelihood of financial distress. According
to MetLife, the FSOC's reading of the statute not to require such an assessment would mean that "FSOC
has no reason to consider designation under the Second Determination Standard, which looks at current
reality." MetLife Brief at 28. Consequently, according to MetLife, the Second Determination Standard "is
effectively a dead letter." Id. That argument seems correct, but MetLife's suggested remedy for the
incongruence namely, that the "FSOC must establish a basis for evaluating a company under the First
Determination Standard," presumably by assessing the likelihood of financial distress provides no cure.
Even under that formulation, the Second Determination Standard ends up as a dead letter. Such is the
implication of the Redundant "Determination Standards" Problem the universe of cases meeting the
First Determination Standard will by definition also meet the Second Determination Standard.
371. See supra Section IV.B.1.
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Analytic Framework,3 2 contradicted the terms of the Analytic Framework
itself.373 When it finalized its rule, the FSOC opted to accommodate industry
requests to require an assessment of the likelihood of financial distress at the
designated company. It was not required to do so, but it did; now it must comply.
The FSOC might advance two possible explanations for the discrepancy
between the Analytic Framework and its determinations, neither of which is
availing. First, it might claim that it is interpreting its Analytic Framework not
to include a requirement to assess likelihood. The problem with that
interpretation is straightforward: it expressly conflicts with the Analytic
Framework. To expressly disclaim any intention of performing a duty it
announced itself is to act arbitrarily and capriciously.3  Second, it might argue
that it has reconsidered its position regarding the need to assess likelihood.
Agencies have the legal discretion to alter their interpretations and practices, and
are not required to demonstrate to courts that the reasons for a new policy are
better than the reasons for a former policy.3 7' Here, however, the agency
displayed no awareness at least prior to trial that it was changing its position
at all.6
If the Filter remains in place, this shortcoming likely frustrates any future
FSOC designations.3  In fact, the district court found in favor of MetLife on this
argument and ordered rescission of MetLife's designation.38 The F SOC, which
initially had appealed the district court judgment, voluntarily dismissed its appeal
in January 2018, cementing the district court judgment as final.3  While MetLife
372. See supra text accompanying note 364.
373. MetLife Brief supra note 120, at 29-30.
374. Under the Auer/Seminole Rock line of precedent, administrative agencies are
entitled to substantial deference when interpreting their own rules. (Indeed, they possess greater
interpretive prerogative than that which Chevron provides them in interpreting their statutes). See Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding
that judicial deference to agency action with respect o its own regulations is appropriate unless the action
is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"). Notwithstanding its breadth, "such deference
is appropriate only so long as the agency's interpretation does no violence to the plain meaning of the
provision." Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1310-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
375. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring
merely a "conscious change of course").
376. See id. ("[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its
action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position.").
377. A reviewing court could plausibly find the FSOC acted arbitrarily but nevertheless
reject MetLife's motion to rescind the designation on the grounds of "harmless error." See 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2018) ("[A] court shall review the whole record ... and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error."); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (holding that the reference to "the rule
of prejudicial error" in § 706 should be read to incorporate the harmless error ule from appellate review
of trial court judgments in civil litigation). The harmless error doctrine allows a court to affirm an agency
action notwithstanding an error where it is "clear that a remand would accomplish nothing beyond further
expense and delay." Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2001). The application
of such an argument to the MetLife designation is complicated by the clarity of the FSOC's express
disavowal of its need to follow its own Analytic Framework.
378. See MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 233-36.
379. Joint Stipulated Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin.
Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-45).
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(and other future designees) might prevail on this particular judicial challenge, it
by no means insulates these companies from designation in the future. To the
contrary, the FSOC could properly reinstate the designations through two
separate courses of action. First, it could retain the Filter and issue a new
explanation or amend its existing designation explanations linking the record
evidence of vulnerability produced during its Stage 2 and Stage 3 reviews.
Second, it could amend the Analytic Framework to remove the Filter, thereby
abandoning the vulnerability inquiry altogether.
V. Four Other Structural Problems (with Ministerial Fixes)
This Part will describe four structural inconsistencies in the Analytic
Framework. The continued existence of these flaws reinforces the legitimacy
critiques of opponents of the Section 113 regime; more concretely, given the
right circumstances they could give rise to a judicial challenge to the FSOC's
determinations. I refer to these problems in turn as The Redundancy Problem,
the Category Problem, the Double-Counting Problem, and the Category-Channel
Framing Problem. Ultimately, these particular flaws are remediable through
ministerial surface amendments to the rule without any significant effect on the
core administrative praxis with which Congress charged the Council.
A. The Redundancy Problem
The "Redundancy Problem" refers to the fact that the bifurcation of the
Section 113 into two separate pathways one predicated on a "material financial
distress" and the other predicated on a potential designee's "activities"
unnecessarily complicates what is already an intricate, dense Analytic
Framework. As noted earlier, Section 113 itself provides for two pathways to
designation.380 In the Analytic Framework, the FSOC refers to these pathways
as "Determination Standards.",381 Each Determination Standard is ostensibly
predicated on a distinct set of facts.38 2 The first, which the FSOC refers to as the
"First Determination Standard," requires the Council to make a designation
where a "material financial distress" at an investigated nonbank financial
company "could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.
38 3
The FSOC guidance clarifies that a "material financial distress" exists when a
nonbank financial company would be "in imminent danger of insolvency or
defaulting on its financial obligations.38 4 The FSOC's "Second Determination
Standard" requires designation if the agency finds that the "nature, scope, size,
380. See supra text accompanying note 66.
381. See Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,640.
382. See infra text accompanying note 386.
383. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 113(a)(1), 12
U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018).
384. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,657.
Vol. 36, 2019
The FSOC's Designation Program as a Case Study
scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities" at the nonbank
financial company could pose such a threat to financial stability.3 85
Although the Council formally separates the Determination Standards, it
also recognizes the inevitable "significant overlap" between them.386
Characterizing these standards as "overlapping" is generous; the FSOC might
have just as easily described them as "redundant" or "confusedly reflexive." For
instance, if the nature or scope of that firm's "activities" alone could pose a threat
to the financial system, then it is likely, if not inevitable, that a "material financial
distress" at the firm could pose a threat. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a
"material financial distress" at a firm that is attributable to something distinct
from that firm's "activities." The Second Determination Standard (activities)
would seem to include a fortiori the First Determination Standard (financial
distress).38 Indeed, the Framework almost reads as if the FSOC begrudgingly
has included throw-away references to the Second Determination Standard out
of fealty to its organic statute. For instance, the document states:
In evaluating a nonbank financial company under one of the Determination
Standards, the Council intends to assess how a nonbank financial company's
material financial distress or activities could be transmitted to, or otherwise affect,
other firms or markets, thereby causing a broader impairment of financial
intermediation or of financial market fulnctioning.
388
Parsing this passage reveals that the FSOC intends to assess how a
company's "activities could be transmitted to other firms and markets." But, of
course, this makes no sense, and is not what the FSOC means. The policy
problem is the transmission of distress. Now, that "distress" could indeed,
almost certainly would result from the firm's "activities," but the FSOC's
language implies the obvious: that distress itself is the problem.
Here we see the first structural flaw of the framework, which we might refer
to as its "Redundancy Problem." This Redundancy Problem is both the most
trivial and the most difficult to remedy. Since the problem flows from the statute,
the FSOC cannot fix it directly. On the other hand, the FSOC's early enforcement
practice has been to make exclusive use of the First Determination Standard. For
so long as the agency maintains that enforcement practice, the Redundancy
Problem will remain unripe for judicial, or even political, interference simply
an example of syntactic overzealousness on the part of legislative drafters, with




387. The latter is entirely subsumed by the former, which is more capacious.
388. Id.
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B. The Category Problem
The "Category Problem" refers to the fact that the FSOC insists that its
"categories" apply to both Determination Standards, but the concepts only make
sense if they apply to the First Determination Standard. As noted earlier in
Section III.B, the FSOC insists that these "categories" apply to both
Determination Standards, and that they simply encapsulate the ten criteria
outlined in the statute to provide structure to both determination standards.389
However, the six "categories," both on their face and as reflected in the
FSOC's descriptions of them, plainly can only make sense in the context of
"material financial distress," a condition that only applies in the context of the
First Determination Standard. The first three categories (size,
interconnectedness, and substitutability of services) help the FSOC gauge the
"potential impact of [a nonbank financial company's] financial distress on the
broader economy.,390 And the second three categories (leverage, liquidity risk
and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny) help the FSOC "assess
the vulnerability of a [nonbank financial company] to financial distress.",391 This
second grouping of "categories" is, in a very loose sense, predictive and
probabilistic, designed to help the FSOC obtain a sense of the likelihood that a
material financial distress materializes in the first place.
Consequently, the Category Problem presents us with the Framework's
second structural inconsistency. The application of this key pillar of the Analytic
Framework to the Second Determination Standard is, at best, ambiguous. The
categories which, again, assess the likelihood and the impact of a material
financial distress, the predicate circumstance for the First Determination
Standard can only be relevant under that particular standard. But whereas the
"categories" only can apply to the First Determination Standard, the FSOC
insists that they apply equally to the Second Determination Standard. Having
uncovered the limited scope of the categories, we are faced with a looming
lacuna concerning how the FSOC would approach a Section 113 investigation
pursuant to the Second Determination Standard.
The FSOC therefore risks judicial rescission of a potential future
designation premised on the Second Determination Standard on the grounds that
the FSOC will have acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying in one context
a regulatory standard expressly designed for another context. Two possible
explanations might at least account for the Category Problem. Although neither
of them can fully resolve the problematic nexus between the categories and the
Second Determination Standard, they explain why the problem might be unlikely
to present complications for the Council in the future.
389. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
390. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,658 (emphasis added).
391. Id.
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First, we might read the plain application of the categories to the First
Determination Standard as an implicit assertion on the part of the FSOC that it
only intends to enforce that Standard. The fact that each of the FSOC's
designations to date has relied on the First Determination Standard, without even
mentioning the Second Determination Standard, supports or at least fails to
invalidate that hypothesis. The nonbank financial industry (qua potential
designees) would welcome such an approach because, as discussed above, the
First Determination Standard is narrower than the Second Determination.392
Moreover, this explanation would resolve the Redundancy Problem discussed
above as well.393 Such an interpretation prompts a follow-on point: if the FSOC
is undercutting the rationale for separating the two standards in the first place,
and it should state so expressly.
Another possible interpretation would ascribe the Category Problem (and
the FSOC's decision to carry forward the Redundancy Problem) to intra-
governmental institutional comity. On this interpretation, the Council
incorporated into its regulations congressional instructions that it knows to be
misplaced possibly with no intention of deploying them. This explanation also
finds support in the FSOC's enforcement practices to date. Whatever the
explanation for the Category Problem, the issue is not ripe at present for a judicial
correction, notwithstanding the obvious confusion the categories present.
C. The Double-Counting Problem
The "Double-Counting Problem" refers to the fact that the analytic
Framework confusedly includes "existing regulatory scrutiny" as both a
"category" and a "qualitative factor." As mentioned earlier in Section 111.B, a
final component of the Analytic Framework, the FSOC will consider certain
"qualitative factors," including existing regulatory scrutiny, during its Stage 3
inquiry. The FSOC assesses whether these factors might "mitigate or aggravate
the potential of the nonbank financial company to pose a threat to U.S. financial
stability. ' 394 Consideration of existing regulatory scrutiny flows from Section
113 itself, which includes as one of its ten statutory designation factors "the
degree to which the company is already regulated by [one] or more primary
financial regulatory agencies[.],,395 While the statute does not expressly refer to
the other qualitative factors, it clearly authorizes the FSOC to incorporate them
into its designation framework through its open-ended invitation to the agency
,, ,,396
to consider "any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate.
392. See supra note 387.
393. See supra Section V.A (introducing the Redundancy Problem).
394. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,646.
395. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1 13(a)(2)(H), 12
U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(H) (2018).
396. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2)(K), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(K) (2018).
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Therefore, there is nothing objectionable with the Council's inclusion of
mitigating-aggravating circumstances in the Framework; to the contrary, it
would appear sensible to do so in light of the FSOC's responsibility to determine
which companies could pose a systemic threat. Nevertheless, the Framework's
treatment of the qualitative factors presents a problem inasmuch as the
Framework already addresses the same "existing regulatory scrutiny" factor in
the "category" analysis.39 The problem is as easily remediable as it is obvious;
FSOC should simply restrict consideration of existing regulatory scrutiny in a
single context. The question is which context: as a category or as a qualitative
factor. Since the effectiveness of existing regulatory-supervisory scrutiny can
limit the likelihood of a company's financial distress, consideration of this factor
might more appropriately belong as one of the FSOC's "categories" which, it
will be recalled, in their present iteration are designed in part to assess a
company's vulnerability to financial distress instead of as a supplemental, add-
on "qualitative factor." Inclusion as a category is also appropriate in light of the
FSOC's position that the categories are intended to reflect the ten statutory
factors (of which existing regulatory scrutiny is one).398
D. The Category-Channel Framing Problem
The "Category-Channel Framing Problem" refers to an ensemble of
complications resulting from the Analytic Framework's ambiguous
characterization of categories and transmission channels. The FSOC uses the
categories to examine a firm in isolation and uses the transmission channels to
view the company in relation to the system. On its own, such a conceptual
framework would be unremarkable, but the statute itself never mentions this
division. Numerous confusions and ddjd vu moments result from this
formulation because several of the category inquiries which, again, focus on
the firm itself plainly relate to the transmission of distress through the financial
system.
For example, it is puzzling that three categories (size, interconnectedness,
and substitutability) are used to "assess the potential impact" of a material
financial distress on the economy,399 and the three separate channels are used to
evaluate" a company's "potential to pose a threat.,40 0 If the FSOC meant to
distinguish having-a-potential-impact from potentially-posing-a-threat, i  did
not explain itself. In other words, why not simply export the size,
interconnectedness, and substitutability "categories" into the "transmission
channels" analysis? For example, consider that interconnectedness plainly only
makes sense in the context of a transmission analysis, yet the FSOC considers it
397. See supra text accompanying note 178.
398. See supra text accompanying note 389.
399. Final FSOC Section 113 Guidance, supra note 8, at 21,658
400. Id. at 21,661.
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in the putatively firm-focused "category" analysis. Perhaps it might be objected
that those category factors (size, substitutability, interconnectedness) are not
themselves "transmission channels" themselves so much as transmission factors
that make a company itself more likely to serve as a contagion vector in a given
transmission channel. While that is true, it only highlights the problem: why
bother with the artificial conceptual segregation of categories and channels? Two
quick fixes are possible.
First, it would be clearer if the FSOC addressed those factors as part of the
transmission channel inquiries themselves. For example, a company's size is by
definition a relevant factor to considering how contagion might transmit through
an asset liquidation, or "fire sale." The guidance expressly acknowledges as
much when it, for instance, includes "total debt outstanding" among the
"metrics" it will consider when analyzing both the "exposure channel' 40 1 and the
"interconnectedness category.40 2 Or when the guidance requires consideration
of the "consolidated assets" metric in the analysis of both the "exposure
channel' 403 and the "size category.'40 4 Similarly, the critical function-service
channel expressly requires the FSOC to determine that "there are no ready
substitutes.4 °5 It is difficult to conceive of how this component of the channel
analysis could differ from the "substitutability" "category." With this approach,
the FSOC could dispense with half of the "categories" altogether on the grounds
that they are already necessarily taken into consideration as part of the
transmission channels analysis. The category analysis would then emerge as
sharply focused on the likelihood or vulnerability of the firm to material financial
distress.
Second, it would also be clearer if the FSOC reorganized the "transmission
channels" inquiry so that it would gauge more broadly a subject company's
potential role as a contagion vector in the system. With that approach, the inquiry
would more accurately map onto, and return focus to, the hypothetical inquiry
actually set forth in the statute: assuming the material financial distress
materializes, could it compromise the wider financial system? Such an approach
would involve importing the contagion-related "categories" (i.e., size,
substitutability, and interconnectedness) into a new impact-focused inquiry that
would demote, in effect, the "transmission channels" from the organizing
principle of the inquiry to a component part of the inquiry.
Compared to the three other fixable problems, the Category-Channel
Framing Problem requires a more structural reworking of the Analytic
401. Id. at 21,657.
402. Id. at 21,659.
403. Id. at 21,657.
404. Id. at 21,659.
405. Id. at 21,657 (emphasis added); see also id. (providing that FSOC will consider
"the ability of other firms to replace those services" in its critical function-service channel" inquiry
(emphasis added)).
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Framework. In the end, however, the FSOC can remedy these problems through
what should be an uncontroversial amendatory rulemaking.
E. These Problems Have Ministerial Fixes
The foregoing discussion has individuated four problems with the existing
Analytic Framework that threaten to undermine the conceptual regularity and
consistency of Section 113 designations. I have labeled these problems the
Redundancy Problem, the Category Problem, the Double-Counting Problem,
and the Category-Channel Framing Problem. Figure 5 sets forth below a brief
description of the problem and the proposed solution, if applicable.
Figure 5
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In the high style of substantive-instrumental rationality,40 6 such a suite of
amendments would structure a more coherent and transparent Section 113
designation administrative process without fundamentally paring back the
discretionary powers that Congress plainly intended the Council to possess. The
406. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text (discussing substantive-
instrumental rationality and "analytic management" as legitimating bases for administrative action).
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FSOC's discretion remains, but the legitimacy of its exercise is bolstered by a
more streamlined and rationalized decision process, as well as more openness
about what that process and analysis entail.
Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate conceptual maps of the Analytic
Framework following the proposed amendments. Two separate figures are
required to account for the two alternative modes of redressing the Category-
Channel Framing Problem, as discussed above. Figure 6 integrates the size,
interconnectedness, and substitutability "categories" into the extant
"transmission channel" inquiry; Figure 7 imports those "categories" into a newly
streamlined second-step inquiry that looks at firm-specific factors and system
linkage factors that impact whether a material financial distress could pose a
threat.
Figure 6





i a nda rd I i o MN n~l
I , ci .J e rut
Hy,.h f~q!Y1
Yale Journal on Regulation
Figure 7
Alternative 2
(Importing 'ertni c ¢egortes"
-nto n newly t rnmnqd
fimpact" Inquiry)I
Standard p} sasr- tP d , FaWF- l
< 'tr Ifnic~Id te
O t, 0-Oc" DI: oe yei Thr-C
VI. Conclusions
An administrative law analysis of the F SOC's Section 113 program yields
two sets of findings. First, the FSOC's Analytic Framework contains a series of
internal inconsistencies and ambiguities that could potentially open its
designations up to attacks in both the courts and the political branches. Given the
complicatedness of the Section 113 inquiry that Congress created, this finding is
unsurprising; but given the importance of the program to the post-crisis
supervisory regime, it is also highly problematic. As such, this Article urges that
the FSOC adopt a comprehensive suite of recommended remedial amendments
that sharpen the Framework without altering its underlying substance or straying
from the statute. Second, the Framework emerges as a case study for how a
significant portion of the post-crisis financial supervisory regime is on the brink
of an administrative law crisis. The three problems identified and discussed in
this Article threaten to whittle a ambt the structure of not only the Section 113
designation program, but also other financial risk-regulatory programs. These
programs such as the Dodd-Frank stress tests, the CCAR, and the resolution
planning programsrequire financial regulators to take inherently contestable
actions in conditions characterized by significant uncertainty. In doing so, the
Article sketches out a roadmap for financial regulators, courts, and scholars of
administrative law and regulation to reconcile these regulatory programs with
U.S. public law doctrine.
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